Corporate governance : the case for Asian REITs by Tan, Denise, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1 
 
 
Corporate Governance: The Case for Asian REITs 
by 
Denise Tan 
B.A., Economics, 2001 
University of California at Berkeley 
 
Submitted to the Center for Real Estate in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Science in Real Estate Development 
 
at the 
 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
September, 2009  
 
©2009 Denise Tan 
All rights reserved 
 
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and 
electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now known or 
hereafter created. 
 
 
Signature of Author_________________________________________________________ 
Center for Real Estate 
July 24, 2009 
 
Certified by_______________________________________________________________ 
Lynn Fisher 
Associate Professor of Real Estate 
Thesis Supervisor 
 
Accepted by_______________________________________________________________   
Brian A. Ciochetti 
Chairman, Interdepartmental Degree Program in 
Real Estate Development 
2 
 
Corporate Governance: The Case for Asian REITs 
by 
Denise Tan 
 
Submitted to the Center for Real Estate on July 24, 2009 in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Real Estate Development 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
At the entity level, the design of sound corporate governance mechanisms is critical for REITs 
that are preparing to go public.  At the industry level, issues of transparency and corporate 
governance are consequential to the further development of REITs in Asia.  This study looks at 
various REIT regimes and corporate governance systems around the world.  It then proceeds to 
examine the governance structures in place at the time of an IPO in the emerging REIT market of 
Singapore.  The mechanisms of corporate governance used to evaluate the IPO of the REIT 
include (i) board structure and composition, (ii) ownership, (iii) compensation, and (iv) takeover 
defenses.  The findings point to evidence that corporate governance structures are not “one size 
fits all” and must be tailored to fit the appropriate institutional context.   
 
Thesis Supervisor: Lynn Fisher 
Title: Associate Professor of Real Estate 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
US Pioneers REITs 
Real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) are companies dedicated to owning and, in most cases, 
operating income-producing real estate, such as apartments, shopping centers, offices and 
warehouses.  Pioneered in the United States (“US”) by an act of Congress, REITs were first 
introduced in 1960 as a way of allowing smaller investors to invest in large-scale, income-
producing real estate through equity ownership in companies.  Among several tests to qualify as 
a REIT, an entity has to have revenue primarily from real estate investments and is required to 
distribute at least 90 percent of their taxable income to shareholders1. 
 
The US REIT industry can be defined by the two periods of growth - the pre-modern and post 
modern era. In the period leading up to the early nineties, the REIT industry suffered from 
setbacks of slow growth and lack of investor confidence.  A couple developments on the capital 
markets and legislative side helped to trigger developments in the early nineties.  The tax reform 
act of 1986 eliminated the tax advantage of real estate limited partnerships and in turn, increased 
the attractiveness for owners of private real estate to go public by contributing their properties in 
a tax efficient manner through REITs.  The Kimco Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) in 1991 is 
widely credited as ushering the beginning of the “modern REIT era”.  The introduction of the 
Umbrella REIT (“UPREIT”) structure by the Taubman Companies also further facilitated the 
public acceptance of the publicly-traded REIT vehicles.   In addition, the look-through provision 
of 1993 relaxed the “five or fewer rule” ownership requirement for pension funds and allowed 
the industry to grow further with more institutional participation.  Since then, REITs have 
provided ongoing dividend income along with the potential for long-term capital gains through 
share price appreciation, and also served as a powerful tool for portfolio balancing and 
diversification for investors. 
 
                                                 
 
1
 Please refer to Appendix for REIT qualification criteria. 
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Maturity Brings Governance 
If congressional intent in introducing REITs was arguably to allow the everyday man a chance to 
have a stake in the wealth of a nation’s real estate, the importance of protecting these 
shareholders’ interest has been underscored by the corporate governance mechanisms that have 
been implemented in regulating REITs.  The REIT market has matured, in terms of its depth and 
breadth, its managerial talent, its legislation, and importantly in terms of its governance. There is 
increasing empirical evidence on the positive relationship between good corporate governance 
practices and a firm’s market valuation, while consensus in financial circles also shows corporate 
governance is gaining an important role in investment decisions.  The US REIT industry has 
grown dramatically since inception from a market capitalization of less than USD 10 billion in 
1990 to approximately USD 300 billion today.     
 
International REITs have followed 
The ongoing success of the REIT model in the US has led many countries in Asia to introduce a 
REIT-like structure to facilitate capital inflows into their respective real estate sectors as well.  
Countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia 
have boarded the current REIT bandwagon with their own REIT IPOs.  As one of the fastest 
growing regions in terms of gross domestic product and urbanization rates, Asia represents a 
large frontier market for REITs.  The proportion of REIT ownership of institutional-grade real 
estate in many Asian cities has been steadily increasing over the past ten years.  Asia also has the 
lowest level of securitized real estate in the world.  In September 2006, UBS estimated that only 
approximately 4 percent of investment grade real estate in Asia was held in REIT-type 
structures.2  The two most populous nations of China and India have yet to introduce legislation 
for REITs, but there has been much speculation that this could be a reality within a few years. 
 
As we continue to see a structural shift from private to public ownership of real estate in these 
emerging markets, the importance of studying the mechanisms and effectiveness of corporate 
governance in these REITs is equally relevant as its growth.   Just as REITs have proliferated in 
                                                 
 
2
 Source: UBS Q Series Research: Can Asian REITs Recycle Capital for Half the World’s Population? 
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the US markets, they will too in Asia as an ideal vehicle for placing capital in international real 
estate. 
 
1.2 Research motivation and questions 
 
In writing this paper, my goal is to educate and advocate for the increased role of corporate 
governance in the Asian REIT markets.  In wake of the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, the continuing 
relevance of corporate governance to the growth of the Asian economies has been underscored.  I 
have been interested in synthesizing the available information on the emergence of REIT 
vehicles in Asia and applying the current knowledge to the debate of corporate governance issues 
that these vehicles have brought to surface.  Corporate governance structures are essential for a 
well-developed, functioning marketplace.  The presence of a good, effective corporate 
governance system helps to instill confidence in the market and facilitate a more information-
efficient economy.  Both of which are the underpinnings of economic growth, whether in Asia or 
globally.   
 
The cost of good governance does not come cheaply.  The benefits of adopting high standards 
should, however, outweigh the drawbacks as the real estate sector, enabling REITs in particular 
to move toward greater efficiency, stability, and long-term growth.   
 
1.3 Research methodology and Structure of thesis 
 
Using the US REIT market as a touchstone, this thesis examines the current corporate 
governance mechanisms in place for Asian REITs.   While ex-ante evidence on public-listed 
firms’ valuation shows the positive relationship between corporate governance and share price, 
the use of initial public offerings (“IPO”) helps to mitigate any endogeneity3 issues and offers 
lessons learned in REIT formation.  This thesis is a qualitative study drawing upon an extensive 
                                                 
 
3
 In econometrics, the problem of endogeneity occurs when parameters in a model are predicted by variables other 
than those defined by the model. An pricing model for newly-public firms can be isolated around the single IPO 
event while seasoned firms will have more variables, other than those present at time of IPO that will affect their 
pricing. 
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collection of academic research, trade publications and journals, analyst reports, REIT securities 
rules, and public financial reports for listed REITs.  In addition, a case study, CapitaRetail China 
Trust (“CRCT”), in the emerging REIT market of Singapore is used to illuminate the variation in 
governance structures in mature versus emerging markets.  Having first pioneered REITs in Asia 
and then going on to introduce cross border vehicles, CRCT’s sponsor, CapitaLand has a history 
of being an innovative real estate developer.  CapitaRetail China Trust is one of CapitaLand’s 
cross border REITs investing in retail property assets in China, and its successful IPO helps to 
highlight critical governance mechanisms in Singapore. 
 
In my thesis, I will refer to the US as a “mature” market with regards to the REIT industry, and 
countries in the infancy of their growth as “emerging” markets. Many of these other countries 
such as Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, are just in the early stages of 
their growth cycle. 
 
In order to achieve the research objective set forth in the previous section, this thesis is organized 
into five chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 starts by briefly providing the background and context surrounding the research.  The 
research motivation, objectives, and methodology are also introduced. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces important concepts of corporate governance and its history in the Asian 
context.  The chapter also discusses the different mechanisms that are used to govern to REITs.  
This chapter also proceeds to review the current literature on the topic. 
 
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth overview of various REIT legal regimes around the world and a 
comparative analysis of the same.   It will introduce the role of legislation in catalyzing REIT 
markets. 
 
Chapter 4 takes a closer look at CRCT’s IPO that had taken place in the emerging REIT market 
of Singapore.  Due to the maturity and size of the United States REIT markets, its legislation and 
governance structures are used as an important point of reference.   
12 
 
 
Chapter 5 draws conclusions of the research and addresses the future of corporate governance in 
emerging REIT markets. 
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CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
While the appropriate model for corporate governance differs from the economy in question, the 
generally accepted definition as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”) is the “procedures and processes according to which an organization is 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among the different participants in the organization – such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and procedures for 
decision-making.”4 
 
Corporate governance addresses the problems that arise from separation of control and 
ownership of a firm.  These mechanisms try to reduce or eliminate related agency costs and 
conflict of interests that arise from having multiple interest groups or stakeholders.  Much of the 
impetus for sound corporate governance has been driven by the needs of the corporate 
shareholder to exercise their rights of ownership and control the value of their holdings.  Sound 
corporate governance helps to provide a degree of confidence that is essential for the proper 
functioning of a market economy 
 
The debate over problems with dispersed versus concentrated ownership and their solutions 
originated largely in “The Modern Corporation and Private Property” (Berle and Means 1932).  
Economist Ronald Coase, in "The Nature of the Firm" (1937), introduced the concept of 
transaction costs to explain the existence, nature and limits of firms.  Coase explains why the 
economy is populated by a number of business firms, instead of consisting exclusively of a 
multitude of independent, self-employed people who contract with one another.   
 
                                                 
 
4
 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 
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The seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976) provides the primary starting point for the 
majority of research focusing on internal control and agency costs. Jensen and Meckling identify 
agency costs as resulting from a separation of ownership and control.  However, this separation 
would not create a conflict if all actions of the manager were known and controllable by the 
owners.  Thus, the discussion of agency costs could also be one of making information 
accessible to current and potential owners.  As such, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
agency costs could be reduced by advancements in auditing, formal control systems, and security 
analyst following. 
 
Jensen and Fama continue to expand the understanding of corporate governance with “The 
Separation of Ownership and Control” (1983)5.  Fama and Jensen contend that separation of 
decision and risk bearing functions survives in organizations in part because of the benefits of 
specialization of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common 
approach to controlling the implied agency problems.   
 
The importance of corporate governance became exceptionally clear when a string of corporate 
catastrophes in 2002 led to the destruction of billions of dollars of shareholder value.  Detailed 
accounts of corporate fraud, accounting scandals, excessive compensation, and other perceived 
organizational failures—many of which culminated in lawsuits, resignations, and bankruptcy – 
were all attributed to a lack of corporate governance.  Enron, WorldCom, Adephia, Tyco, and 
Global Crossing were all companies that were vetted as “institutional quality” by the public 
investing community, but yet encountered bankruptcy as their corporate governance mechanism 
of checks and balances failed.  Investor confidence in the stock markets was evidently shaken by 
what was deemed “unimaginable”.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed quickly by the US 
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Council (“SEC”) to regulate public companies.  The 
act covers issues such as auditor independence, corporate governance, internal control 
assessment, and enhanced financial disclosure. 
                                                 
 
5
 For a discussion of how to control the downside of dispersed shareholder ownership and maximize the benefits 
from dispersed shareholder ownership and risk bearing, see Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 26 L. Law & Econ. 301 (1983). 
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With the increasing securitization of wealth in various corporate entities and institutions, 
corporate governance has been the subject of significant debate around the world.    According to 
LRN, a professional provider of ethics and responsibility in the workplace, key elements of good 
corporate governance principles include honesty, trust and integrity, openness, performance 
orientation, responsibility and accountability, mutual respect, and commitment to the 
organization6.   
 
The corporate governance system of a corporation can be divided into two categories, namely 
internal governance and external governance.  The internal governance mechanisms of a firm 
include monitoring by the board of directors, internal auditors, shareholder-management balance 
of power, and performance-based remuneration structures.  The external governance mechanisms 
include the capital markets, the public sector, regulations which may be the result of 
executive/agency decisions and the labor market.  Internal corporate governance controls 
monitor activities and advise corrective action to accomplish organizational goals, while external 
corporate governance controls encompass the controls external stakeholders exercise over the 
organization. Together the internal and external governance mechanisms of a firm align the 
incentives of the managers with shareholders, and motivate managers to maximize firm value. 
 
Global Standards of Corporate Governance 
There are many variations on the ideal model of corporate governance around the world.  
Corporate governance models cannot be seen in isolation to the economies and institutional 
underpinnings in which they operate (Guillen 2000).  The Anglo-Saxon model, also called the 
liberal model, emphasizes the right of the shareholders and is reflective of its capital-markets 
driven economy.  The Continental European model takes in broader view in that, in addition to 
emphasizing the rights of the shareholders, it also recognizes the interests of stakeholders such as 
workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the community. The OECD report on Corporate 
Governance in Asia (2004) discusses how corporate governance issues have gained visibility 
                                                 
 
6
 LRN is a provider of solutions that foster corporate ethics and responsibility in the workplace. 
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among policy makers due to the increasingly globalization of capital flows as both international 
and domestic investors demand compatibility and transparency of information. In addition to the 
globalization of markets, factors such as a more propitious environment for international 
cooperation and policy debate and a clear convergence of legislative and regulatory trends make 
it more compelling for the adoption of corporate governance frameworks globally.  Guillen, 
however, argues that while conventional wisdom dictates that models of corporate governance 
should converge towards a single model due to globalization, evidence shows that there has been 
little convergence in the two main models in the last twenty years.   
 
In France, where the reception to the American import of corporate governance was initially met 
with a cold reception, a tremendous breakthrough has been made following spectacular financial 
losses resulting from unmonitored managerial initiatives (Credit Lyonnais, Michelin, Paribas, 
Suez, Union des Assurances de Paris) (Naciri 2008).  Measures include strengthening of 
minority shareholders’ rights and internationalization of ownership and corporate boards. 
 
The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries 
because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in 
the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally 
regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system 
(Reinhardt 2003).    In Germany, shareholders often choose half the members of the board with 
employees choosing the other half (Fukao 1995). 
 
While Japan has moved towards adopting the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, its 
biggest obstacle lies in the founding ideologies of the Japanese corporations.  Pre-war, Japanese 
zaibatsu
7 were organized around a bank for their source of capital. This system is usually 
characterized by long-term cooperative relationships between managers, major shareholders, and 
business partners.  Shares of the corporation are also held by key customers, suppliers and allied 
corporations on a reciprocal basis (Luo 2007).   Culturally, the society is also ascribes to the 
                                                 
 
7
 Zaibatsu is a Japanese term that refers to the large family owned conglomerates that controlled much of the 
Japanese economy prior to World War II during the Edo and Meiji periods. 
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tradition of obligation, family and consensus.  Although Japanese policy makers have 
emphasized the importance of adopting effective corporate governance structures, the post-war 
keiretsu
8 industrial groups (which have taken over the now-illegal zaibatsu) are not 
fundamentally or culturally different from their predecessors in many ways. 
 
The Korean system of centralized shareholding is an outgrowth of its tradition of family 
ownership with company founders and family members maintaining majority share and control 
of in the companies.  The model of the Korean chaebols rely on a complex system of 
interlocking ownership which impede the establishment of effective corporate governance 
structures without first being dismantled9.   
 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 has played the role of catalyst in the corporate governance 
debate by highlighting the lack of effective corporate governance control mechanisms. On one 
hand, there is weak outside monitoring by stakeholders in firms, capital markets, and capital 
institutions.  On the other hand, there is concentration of control in small groups of interest that 
are often very closely connected to the state and the financial sector.   The legacy of family-
owned and family-controlled businesses, together with cross-holdings among corporations added 
to the web of problems faced by the Asian economies.  The lack of transparency of these 
arrangements, combined with increasing corporate exposure (direct and indirect) to international 
capital markets created vulnerabilities that led to the crisis.  Johnson, Boone, Breach and 
Friedman (1999) found that measures of corporate governance, particularly the effectiveness of 
protection for minority shareholders, explain the extent of depreciation and stock market decline 
in the Asian financial crisis of 1997 better than do standard macroeconomic measures.   They 
                                                 
 
8
 A keiretsu is a group of closely related Japanese companies, often with interlocking ownership. Traditionally, 
there have been both horizontal and vertical keiretsu. Horizontal keiretsu center on a main bank and their 
companies span various industries. Vertical keiretsu center on a major manufacturer, like Toyota, and include its 
various suppliers and wholesalers. It encourage its members to award contracts to sister companies and cooperate 
with each other for the overall good of the keiretsu. The keiretsu dominated the Japanese economy in the last half of 
the twentieth century. 
9
 The Korean chaebols are the large, conglomerate family-controlled firms of South Korea characterized by strong 
ties with government agencies.   
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find that in countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic prospects possibly result 
in more expropriation by managers and thus an even larger fall in asset prices. 
 
In wake of the crisis, Asian economies have issued new corporate governance codes to promote 
best practices among their constituents. The international financial institutions (IFIs) which 
organized the emergency financial assistance for the crisis economies - the International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank and Asian Development Bank - were instrumental in the inclusion 
of corporate governance on the reform agenda. Yet prior to the crisis, corporate governance had 
not been a part of these institutions' crisis response programs, and the institutions had only 
limited familiarity with the issue (Metzger 2004). 
 
2.2 Going Public and Corporate Governance 
 
Before a private company becomes a public company, it should look like one.  Accessing 
external capital sources introduces the challenges of ensuring that a REIT’s corporate 
governance structure is efficient so that the stock will be priced accurately by the investor 
community.   The IPO decision is fundamentally interrelated to the design of an efficient 
governance structure.  The choice of public status is one of balancing the two forces of 
concentrated private ownership and dispersed public ownership. Just the notion of the perceived 
quality of a REIT’s corporate governance can influence its share price as well as the cost of 
raising debt and equity capital in the public markets.   
 
Draho (2004) contends that implementing an effective corporate governance structure at IPO is 
critical for a number of reasons.  Since the firm value is a function of the governance structure 
adopted, the amount of proceeds that can be raised from the offering is directly impacted. The 
future firm performance depends on the incentive and control mechanisms that are in place for 
management.  In addition, the legal reorganization of an issuer that precedes the IPO is decided 
by a small select group of shareholders, pre-dispersion of shareholder base. The structure 
decided at the IPO stage is likely to persist. 
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Governance structures established in the IPO process typically share at least the following two 
characteristics.  First, investors must be able to monitor management to ensure that value-
maximizing course of actions are undertaken. Secondly, investors must have control rights to 
take remedial actions against management if monitoring reveals inadequacy or inappropriateness 
(Draho 2004).  
 
The effect of corporate governance mechanisms on after-market performance of IPOs is not clear 
as there exists multiple sources of “noise” affecting a firm’s valuation during its life as a public 
company.  On the other hand, IPOs represent a good context in which to study governance 
choices and the corresponding value that investors assign to the firm because they mitigate the 
problem of endogeneity that established firms present. 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance in REITs  
 
RiskMetrics Group (previously known as Institutional Shareholder Services) measures the 
governance practices of the US real estate industry by a metric called Corporate Governance 
Quotient (“CGQ”).  The CGQ measures up to 63 corporate governance variables, categorized 
under four areas of focus: (1) board of directors, (2) audit, (3) anti-takeover provisions, (4) 
executive and director compensation.  Some of the variables are reviewed together under the 
premise that corporate governance is enhanced when selected combinations of these variables are 
adopted.10  The findings for real estate companies have been well-above average for the last five 
years11.  The real estate industry ranking has the second-highest average Index CGQ among all 
industries behind utilities.   Among the US real estate companies, Developers Diversified Realty 
                                                 
 
10
 Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ®), a corporate governance rating system provided by Risk Metrics Group 
(fka Institutional Shareholder Services) on over 8,000 companies worldwide, evaluates the strengths, deficiencies, 
and risks of a company's corporate governance practices and board of directors. 
11
 CGQ rates the governance practices of 200 real estate companies in the United States, virtually all of which are 
REITs. 
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Corp., Regency Centers Corp. and AMB Corp., scored the highest for CGQ.  Please refer to the 
Appendix for the rankings by industry and by firm12. 
 
While there are many studies that relate the role of corporate governance with the long-term 
performance of a firm, there are a few legal restrictions and structures that make REITs unique 
with respect to other firms in regards to the nature of their corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
Payout Requirement 
Firstly, to qualify as a REIT in the US, the firm has to distribute at least 90 percent of its taxable 
income (excluding net capital gains) as dividends.  This payout requirement tends to mitigate 
particular agency costs as management of the REIT has fewer opportunities for expropriation of 
cash flow.  However, in turn the payout requirement puts pressure on the REITs to meet their 
dividend policies and restricts their ability to fund growth through the use of retained earnings.   
The REIT has to balance its expected dividend yield rate and expected share price growth rate.  
As the market tends to penalize a REIT’s stock price when it fails to meet dividends, REITs 
often have to look to the equity and debt markets for additional capital (Hartzell, Kallberg, Liu 
2008). 
 
Management Format/Structure 
Secondly, REITs can choose to be externally-advised (advisor REIT) or internally-advised (self-
administered REIT).  The REIT’s decision of management structure ultimately affects the 
corporate governance issues it faces. An externally-advised REIT typically hires a separate 
business entity to supervise the ongoing entity-level operations of the REIT in exchange for an 
advisory fee. Such advisory services include, for example, making decisions or recommendations 
to buy or sell a property, declare dividends, raise capital, or hire on-site mangers or other 
employees, in all cases subject to the oversight of the company’s board of directors or trustees.  
An externally-advised REIT can have employees as well, but it subcontracts with an outside 
                                                 
 
12
 Among the mechanisms that are evaluated to determine a REIT’s corporate governance include: Board and Key 
Committee Independence, Board Practices, Takeover Defenses/Shareholder Rights, Compensation and Ownership, 
and Audit Factors. 
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entity for supervisory services. An internally-advised REIT provides these services through its 
own employees.  Greater potential for conflicts of interest exists for advisor REITs relative to 
self-administered REITs (Sagalyn 1996).   
 
The potential for conflict is especially pronounced when the interests of the REIT sponsor (firm 
that started the REIT) and the REIT advisor differ from that of the REIT’s stockholders.  An 
example of a potential conflict of interest that can arise is in the acquisition and disposal of real 
estate assets.   The REIT advisor can purchase and manage assets for third-party accounts other 
than the REIT sponsor. Typically, the advisor does not have an obligation to make investment 
opportunities available to the REIT sponsor on a right of first refusal basis.   Competition for the 
same investment opportunities frequently can arise between the REIT advisor and the REIT 
sponsor.  The REIT advisor may have different incentives to act on its own behalf and on behalf 
of the REIT (the basic agency problem).  Most REIT advisors share managers, boards of 
directors and their chief executive with the sponsoring company, which leads to even more 
conflicts of interest.  If the incentives of the directors are not handled appropriately, the 
governance structure can fail.   While efforts should be made to make sure that these conflicts are 
handled in the “best” manner possible, there may be technically, regulatory or informational 
reasons why the agency problem can’t be completely solved.  Regardless of institutional context, 
there should be as much disclosure as possible to mitigate the conflict. 
 
However, there are proponents of the external management structure that argue that it can 
provide significant benefits, e.g. the manager can use its scale to provide services at a more 
economical cost than managing the REIT internally.   
 
The type of compensation arrangement used can create a moral hazard for the managers.  The 
nature of the contractual agreements between the advisor and sponsor can also lead to non- 
arm’s-length transactions, or self-dealing, taking place.  The REIT may purchase properties from 
the sponsor (where the REIT is effectively the takeout vehicle for the sponsor’s portfolio) even 
though there are better options for the REIT.   The REIT sponsor may also extend loans to the 
advisor REIT (or vice versa) at concessionary terms.  The share prices of the REITs and that of 
the sponsor’s (if public), while closely-tied, can be hard to analyze individually.   
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Please refer to the Appendix VI for more detailed information on the conflicts that exist for 
externally-managed REITs.  Before 1991, REITs in the US were required to hire external 
managers to manage their assets, effectively prohibiting them from being internally managed, 
and all REITs at the time of their IPO were externally advised.  Most REITs elected self-advised 
management at the time of their IPO subsequent to the IRS rule change in 1986. 
 
The conflicts of interest inherent in an external management model are potentially mitigated by 
the sponsor’s substantial equity stake in the REIT.  In the largest markets in Asia, most Japanese 
REITs (“JREIT”s) and Singapore REITs (“SREIT”s) are 30 percent owned by the sponsoring 
REIT so as to align themselves with the shareholders’ interests.  
 
Depending on the market in Asia, there exist both internally and externally managed REITs.  
REITs in Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan are permitted to be managed in either format.  REITs in 
other Asian countries are all externally managed.   Australian REITs have a unique stapled 
structure where the management company is “stapled” on to the REIT, hence internalizing 
management13.  An overview of typical management structures of each country are provided in 
Appendix VII. 
 
Figure 1 below shows a typical externally managed REIT structure in Asia. The REIT is set up 
as a vehicle to purchase the real estate assets and in return gains net property income flows from 
the income-producing assets.  The external manager provides management services to the REIT 
in return for management fees.  An independent trustee is appointed to act on behalf of the REIT.   
In return for trustee fees, the trustee’s assumes the role of ensuring that the management team’s 
activities are consistent with REIT codes and legislation.  The unit holders of the REIT purchase 
units on the public market and receive dividends accorded to them. 
                                                 
 
13
 Neo (2007) finds that the Australian REIT markets have seen a full cycle. It started with the listing of private 
property funds in the early 1990s into externally managed and listed REIT vehicles. Property institutionalization 
grew rapidly until the late 1990s, subsequently leading to mergers and takeovers. During this period, the internally 
managed/stapled structure was widely considered to provide better growth prospects through lower management 
fees and higher growth from development. This was followed by an increase in the number of external REITs being 
stapled into the manager-listed company. 
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Figure 1: Externally Managed REIT Structure 
 
Source: UBS 
 
Ownership Requirement 
Third, the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) restricts the ownership concentration of REITs by 
requiring that five or fewer individuals cannot directly or indirectly own more than 50 percent of 
the REITs shares.  This rule effectively limits share ownership of to an average of 10 percent of 
outstanding shares per unrelated individual shareholder.  However, institutional holdings are not 
regarded as a single investor due to a look-through provision made for large investors such as 
pension funds and trusts14.  Due partly to this restriction, REIT insiders and advisors typically 
own only a minimal amount, if any, REIT shares. The five or fewer rule was originally designed 
to diffuse ownership and to prevent management from expropriating wealth from small 
shareholders.  
 
As mentioned previously, in external management structures, the conflicts of interests inherent 
can be partially mitigated by the sponsor holding a substantial amount of equity in the REIT. 
 
                                                 
 
14
 Under the look through provisions, certain institutional shareholders will be considered based on the 
proportional interests of their individual respective shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries.  This treatment is 
called the look through rule, since these entities are looked through to determine if the five or fewer rule is satisfied. 
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Partnership Structure and Investor Class 
Lastly, the umbrella partnership REIT (“UPREIT”) is a variant on the traditional REIT structure.  
The UPREIT structure has a tax benefit over traditional REITs in the acquisition of properties.  
An UPREIT holds all of its assets in, and conducts its business through, a subsidiary umbrella 
partnership in which the REIT is the sole general partner.  Owners of real estate transfer their 
ownership interests to the operating partnership in exchange for limited partner interests in the 
partnership.  Tax deferral is allowed until the partnership units are converted to REIT shares or 
cash.  Typically, the units are converted on a one for one basis for shares.  Acquisitions by the 
operating partnership generally can also be made on a tax deferred basis using operating 
partnership units as acquisition currency.   
 
Please refer to the following diagram for a typical structure of a UPREIT. 
 
Figure 2: Typical UPREIT Structure 
 
Source: Arter & Hadden LLP 
 
However, a disadvantage of the UPREIT is that it has the potential for greater conflicts of 
interest because the UPREIT structure creates two distinct groups of owners: holders of 
partnership shares and the REIT shareholders. The interests of these two shareholder groups can 
differ, for example when new shareholders wish to sell properties acquired vis-à-vis partnership 
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shares. A sale triggers capital gains taxes for shareholders of these partnership shares.  Holders 
of operating partnership units can convert their units into common shares, although this 
conversion triggers a taxable event (Hartzell, Kallberg, Liu 2008). 
 
2.4 Literature Review:  Governance and Value 
 
Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2008) find that REIT governance structure at the time of the IPO, and 
their pre- IPO history are important determinants of initial value and future operating 
performance. Their evidence points to the fact that firms with stronger governance structures 
have higher IPO valuations and better long-term operating performance than their peers.   
 
In empirical literature, there are a growing number of studies which investigate the effect of one 
or more alternative corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of firms.    The 
literature has focused on the relation between individual corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms and performance.  The most recent literature review was conducted by Bauer, 
Eichholtz, et Kok (2009).  Their comprehensive review has found that monitoring mechanisms 
that have been the subject of performance-related real estate research include board structure 
(Friday and Sirmans 1998; Friday, Sirmans and Conover 1999; Ghosh and Sirmans 2003), 
management structure (Ambrose and Linneman 2001; Cannon and Vogt 1995; Howe and 
Shilling 1990; Wei, Hsieh and Sirmans 1995), inside ownership (Capozza and Seguin 2003; Han 
2006), and the involvement of institutional investors (Chan, Leung and Wang 1998; Ling and 
Ryngaert 1997).  These monitoring mechanisms were all found to either individually or 
collectively influence value. 
 
Campbell, Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) study the utility of the UPREIT structure and find 
partnership units issued by UPREITs in payment for properties can function as instruments of 
corporate control, aligning the interests of new executives acquired in the transaction with those 
of the purchasing REIT’s shareholders.  In this process, they have found that significant 
shareholder value is created.  They also find evidence that these financial arrangements are used 
to signal information regarding the firm’s future prospects.    
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2.5 Mechanisms 
 
In analyzing the corporate governance structures of REIT IPOs, I will use the following 
framework.  The mechanisms of corporate governance in the IPO of a REIT broadly include: 
i. Board Structure and Composition 
ii. Ownership 
iii. Compensation  
iv. Takeover Defenses 
 
i. Board Structure and Composition 
In different governance systems, board systems differ with respects to structure, composition, 
organization, committees and tasks.  A one-tier board system comprises both executive and non-
executive directors.  In this system, executives perform double functions of both day-to-day, 
operations and management roles and board oversight roles.  A two-tier system separates the 
executive and non-executive directors.   The highest level consists of only non-executive 
directors that provide supervision, control and strategic advice, while the second level consists of 
executive directors responsible for execution of strategic decisions.  Stakeholder models of 
corporate governance tend to favor the two-tier system of board structure, but the actual structure 
adopted by different countries and firms tend to position themselves along these two continuums. 
 
In both shareholder models and stakeholder models, an emphasis is placed on the percentage of 
independent, non-executive directors on boards to provide an appropriate check and balance on 
the CEO and management.  Fully independent nominating, compensation and audit committees 
provide additional checks on the management’s decisional powers. 
 
ii. Ownership 
Ownership structure refers to the various patterns of control and cash flow rights which 
shareholders possess.  The idea behind the concept of ownership structure is to be able to 
understand the way in which shareholders interact with the firm and each other.  An ownership 
structure assigns rights to individuals or groups of individuals, as well as, prescribes the 
mechanisms for the acquisition, disposal and transfer of these rights.  Rights may be defined with 
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respect to control and/or cash flow (described in more detail in the following section 
“Compensation").  Control rights measure the degree of control given by a share or control 
chain, while cash flow rights measure the cash flow entitlement produced through ownership of 
the share.   
 
In general, two major dimensions of ownership structure are ownership concentration and owner 
type.  Ownership concentration is a quantitative measure which can be reflected by an index; 
while owner type is a qualitative measure that renders information on the nature of the 
shareholder.  Different owner types bring with them different incentives, utility functions and 
means of control. These may include management insiders, subgroups of officers and directors, 
institutional investors, families, company founders, strategic investors and governmental 
organizations (Grob 2007).   
 
iii. Compensation 
Compensation, like ownership-related practices, help define incentives and whether the interests 
of shareholders and managers are aligned and whether the board is an effective check on 
management.   Compensation arrangements to management and board of directors, while an 
important driver of incentives, can give rise to potential sources of conflicts.  The theory of 
agency costs highlights the need to align managerial incentives with shareholders goals (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976).  Various performance-based pay structures, in the form of cash or noncash 
payments such as shares and options, have been used by firms to this end.   Stock compensation 
arrangements with the top REIT executives are normally determined by a committee of 
independent board directors and are often ratified by the shareholders15.  Regardless of the type 
of compensation plan decided upon, of highest relevance is the disclosure and transparency 
requirement. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
15
 NAREIT Consultation Paper 2005 
28 
 
iv. Takeover Defenses 
On one hand, institutional shareholders and corporate governance rating companies have 
criticized takeover defense plans as a means to entrench management; on the other hand, the 
presence of takeover defenses has been argued to protect a firm’s true value from hostile 
acquirers.  Most commonly used is a shareholder rights plan which serves to force an acquirer to 
negotiate with the target company’s board of directors. Typically, if any person or group acquires 
a certain percentage (usually between 10-25 percent) of the voting power of the company’s 
outstanding common stock, stockholders of the company (other than the acquiring person) have 
the right to buy common stock at a substantial discount (often at 50 percent of the market price). 
This results in substantial dilution of the acquiring person’s investment in the company and 
would likely thwart the takeover bid.16   
 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) found that firm valuation first increases as a result of 
convergence of interests between managers and shareholders, then declines because of 
entrenchment of the management team, and finally increases slightly as ownership by the board 
of directors increases.  Field and Karpoff (2002) find that IPO managers tend to deploy defenses 
                                                 
 
16
 Other anti-takeover protections include: 
• Classified boards with staggered terms. 
• Limitations on the ability to call special meetings or take action by written consent. 
• Supermajority vote requirements to approve mergers. 
• Supermajority vote requirements to remove directors. 
• The target adds to its charter a provision which gives the current shareholders the right to sell their shares 
to the acquirer at an increased price (usually 100% above recent average share price), if the acquirer's 
share of the company reaches a critical limit (usually one third). This kind of poison pill cannot stop a 
determined acquirer, but ensures a high price for the company. 
• The target takes on large debts in an effort to make the debt load too high to be attractive—the acquirer 
would eventually have to pay the debts. 
• The company buys a number of smaller companies using a stock swap, diluting the value of the target's 
stock. 
• The target grants its employees stock options that immediately vest if the company is taken over. This is 
intended to give employees an incentive to continue working for the target company at least until a merger 
is completed instead of looking for a new job as soon as takeover discussions begin. However, with the 
release of the "golden handcuffs", many discontented employees may quit immediately after they've cashed 
in their stock options. This poison pill may create an exodus of talented employees. In many high-tech 
businesses, attrition of talented human resources often means an empty shell is left behind for the new 
owner. 
• The practice of having staggered elections for the board of directors.  
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when their compensation is high, shareholdings are small, and oversight from non-managerial 
shareholders is weak.  Control issues are important even at the IPO stage of a firm.  The legacy 
structure of anti-takeover provisions that are implemented during the IPO process tends to stay 
with a firm.   
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CHAPTER 3 - COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MAJOR REIT REGIMES AROUND THE 
WORLD 
3.1 Major REIT Regimes Around the World 
 
Pioneered in the US in the 1960s, REIT and REIT-like vehicles have been exported globally to 
more than 30 countries around the world.  The total market capitalization of REITs globally was 
more than US$600 billion17.  The largest REIT market in the world is still the US, but with other 
regions experiencing massive growth, the gap is narrowing.  The past two years has seen a wave 
of US REIT mergers and acquisitions, hence the fall in number of REITs.  Asia and Europe has 
seen an overall increase in REIT formations and number of REITs.  Figure 3 below highlights 
the growth of REIT numbers by region for selected countries between 2006 and 2008. 
 
Figure 3: Total REITs by Region, 2006 - 2008 
Global Region Country 2006 2007 2008 
North America 
  
United States 253 169 148 
Canada 33 26 33 
EMEIA 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Netherlands 9 7 8 
Belgium 13 17 14 
Germany - - 2 
France 30 42 48 
Turkey - 15 13 
United Kingdom - 14 19 
South Africa 7 7 6 
Pacific 
  
Australia 58 58 64 
New Zealand 6 10 8 
Asia 
  
  
  
  
Japan 38 41 42 
Hong Kong 4 7 7 
South Korea 11 6 6 
Malaysia 11 13 13 
Singapore 11 16 20 
Total   484 448 451 
Source: E&Y EMEIA is a global region made up of Europe, Middle East, India, and Africa. 
Indian REITs were not analyzed in this report. 
                                                 
 
17
 As of 30 June 2008. Source: E&Y Global REIT Report 2008. 
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The extent of regulation to which REITs are subject varies widely from system to system.  
Among the 31 REIT regimes around the world in 2008, 18 countries adopted the corporate form, 
12 countries adopted the unit trust form and 4 countries adopted the form of a fund.     
 
Trust REITs are governed by general statute and are dealt with in the declaration of trust of 
bylaws.   In general, trust structures offer greater flexibility than both the fund and corporate 
forms.  Corporations have well-defined statute that may not be altered in most cases.  These 
statutes may include standard of conduct for directors, standards for dividends, stockholder 
approval for charter amendments, procedures for voluntary dissolution and appraisal rights.  
Many countries like those in Central and South America have REITs that are subject to mutual 
fund-like rules in which the fund is allow to own real estate. 
 
REITs in Australia and New Zealand are pass-through entities regulated as trusts for corporate 
law purposes, but their stock exchanges have special rules regulating REITs . This is in contrast 
with almost all other countries with special REIT provisions in their tax laws for corporations 
that elect REIT status.  As an example, in the US, any entity (including a corporation and 
business trust) can elect REIT status so long as for US tax purposes the entity is classified as an 
association taxable as a corporation. 
 
The following table in Figure 4 outlines the various legal forms that countries have adopted.   
The US REITs are governed by a corporate structure, as are most European REITs.  In Asia, the 
unit trust structure is most predominant.  A summary of the legal and regulatory regimes of 
REITs in Asia are attached in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4: Legal Form Adopted by REIT Regimes Around the World 
No. Region Country Enact Year Legal Form 
1 
Europe 
Netherlands 1969 Corporate 
2 Belgium 1995 Corporate 
3 Turkey 1995 Corporate 
4 Greece 1999 Corporate 
5 France 2003 Corporate 
6 Spain 2003 Corporate/Trust 
7 Bulgaria 2004 Corporate 
8 Germany 2007 Corporate 
9 Italy 2007 Corporate 
10 Lithuania 2007 Corporate 
11 UK 2007 Corporate 
12 
Asia 
Pacific 
New Zealand 1960 Trust/Corporate 
13 Australia 1971 Trust/Corporate 
14 Thailand 1992 Fund 
15 Singapore 1999 Trust 
16 Japan 2000 Corporate/Trust 
17 South Korea 2001 Corporate 
18 Taiwan 2001 Trust 
19 Malaysia 2002 Trust 
20 Hong Kong 2003 Trust 
21 Dubai 2006 Trust 
22 Israel 2006 Corporate 
23 Pakistan 2007 Trust 
24 Africa South Africa No Specific Trust 
25 
America 
USA 1960 Corporate 
26 Puerto Rico 1972 Corporate 
27 Chile 1989 Fund 
28 Brazil 1993 Fund 
29 Canada 1994 Trust 
30 Costa Rica 1997 Fund 
31 Mexico 2004 Trust/Corporate  
Source: The EPRA 2008 Global REIT Report 
 
Global comparative analysis shows that REIT structure and guidelines vary by country.   Each 
country has chosen to implement its own legislative requirements with respect to organizational 
rules, income rules, asset rules, distribution rules, gearing (leveraging) restrictions and other 
considerations.  Even within the same country, policies have seen to be amended from time to 
time in accordance with prevailing market conditions.  For example, the changing tax policy has 
been the great driving force behind movements in the US REIT market during its history of 
almost 50 years.   
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The comparative analyses of major REIT regimes around the world highlight variances unique to 
each country’s regulatory and legislative context.  However, it is important to conclude from the 
analyses that beyond variances, some features remain largely similar among the regimes, 
including: 
 
i. A minimum requirement on the distribution of taxable income (normally at 
least 90 percent). 
ii. Income and asset rules that provide restrictions on investment and 
development activity of the REIT. 
iii. Specifications on taxation exemption at either the REIT or the shareholder 
level. 
iv. The majority of the countries have limitation on a REIT’s leverage ratio. 
v. REIT shares are transferable securities on major stock exchanges.  
 
These common features, in sum, characterize REITs as a passive investment vehicle that 
is liquid, tax-efficient and transparent, and that helps to bring efficiency and 
diversification to the real estate industry. These common features are applicable to and 
are key to the success of both established and emerging REIT regimes (Luo 2008). 
 
 
3.2 Review of Major Asian Markets for REITs 
 
Supported by buoyant economic growth, improving real estate fundamentals and investors’ 
positive market sentiments, Asia’s REITs have flourished and gained substantial success since its 
introduction to the region.  The market has been growing at an impressive rate, from a mere 
US$2 billion in 2001 to a whopping US$68 billion in market capitalization as of June 30, 2008.  
There are currently 115 REITs in Asia with more in the pipeline.  REITs have emerged as an 
increasingly significant investment class in Asia18.    
 
The first REIT to be launched in Asia was the Nippon Building Fund in Japan in September 
2001.   There are now 41 Japanese REITs (or J-REITs) listed with a total market capitalization in 
                                                 
 
18
 EY Global REIT Report 2008.  Please refer to Appendix for more figures on REIT market capitalization. 
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excess of US$21.9 billion19.  REIT legislation was implemented in other parts of Asia shortly 
after its debut in Japan with Singapore being the next REIT market to take off.  Singapore’s 
CapitaLand listed its REIT vehicle for retail assets, CapitaMall Trust on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange in July 2002.  Ascendas, one of the largest industrial landlords in Singapore, followed 
in November 2002 with the Ascendas REIT.   Li Ka-Shing, Hong Kong real estate billionaire, 
took advantage of the opportunity to access cross-border liquidity with the listing of Fortune 
REIT, a Hong Kong suburban retail asset play on the Singapore Stock Exchange in August 
2003l.  A series of several other REITs owned by Singapore Government-Linked Corporations 
(“GLCs”) took suit.  Hong Kong’s Link REIT was the largest IPO in REIT history with its 
US$2.8 billion listing in November 2005.  Within a matter of weeks of Link REIT’s debut, GZI 
REIT (mainland Chinese holdings) and Prosperity REIT (another vehicle by Li Ka-Shing 
holding office and industrial assets) were launched.   Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan and 
other Asian countries followed in the same tracks (Whiting 2007).  
 
Ooi, Newell and Sing (2006) have conducted a comprehensive review on the growth of the REIT 
market in Asia.  Ooi, Newell and Sing start by examining the background of macroeconomic, 
financial market and real estate market development in Asia. In their review, the driving forces 
for REIT development on the supply and demand sides, government initiatives and market 
obstacles are also discussed.   
 
A graphical depiction of their tremendous growth within a short time frame can be seen from the 
Figures 5 and 6.  Figure 5 shows the number of REITs in Asia and Figure 6 shows the market 
capitalization in each country. 
 
                                                 
 
19
  Association for Real Estate Securitization (“ARES”). Data as of 30 April 2009. 
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Figure 5: Number of REITs in Asia (as of December 2008) 
 
Source: CBRE Research 
 
Figure 6: Asia-Listed REITs as of end December 2008 
 
Source: CBRE Research/ Bloomberg 
 
According to CapitaLand, one of the leading REIT sponsors in the region, there are a number of 
factors contributing to the success of Asian REITs, among which, the critical ones are: “quality 
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underlying assets, attractive yield, professional asset management service, and favorable 
regulatory frameworks.”20 
 
3.3 Asian REITs Attributes 
 
Brief overviews of the general REIT characteristics that are most relevant to the analyses in this 
paper have been provided in previous sections and the appendix.  This section focuses on a few 
characteristics unique to Asian REITs. 
 
a. External Management 
In various REIT regimes in Asia, management of the REIT is largely external even though both 
forms of management structure are permitted.  Hong Kong REITs are split between internal and 
external management structures, while both Japanese and Singapore REITs are mostly externally 
managed.  There has yet to be a standardization of management in the different countries.  The 
agency costs of external management discussed earlier can be threats to investors’ perception of 
a REIT’s value. 
 
b. Absence of UPREIT structure 
In the US, the UPREIT structure has been used frequently as a tool for tax deferral.  In addition, 
it has been found by Campbell, Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) that REIT managers are able to 
exploit the unique features of the UPREIT structure in the U.S. to reduce agency costs, signal 
value, and enhance shareholder wealth.  The convertible securities issued by UPREITs in 
payment for properties acquired from private sellers often function as additional instruments of 
corporate control.  Management’s ownership of these securities helps to align their interests with 
those of the shareholders. The financial arrangement has also been a positive signal of the 
REIT’s future prospects.  
 
Findings of Campbell, Ghosh and Sirmans suggest that “the UPREIT structure popular in the US 
has a usefulness that goes beyond that of being an accommodation to local tax policy.”    They 
                                                 
 
20
 CapitaLand Publication available at: http://www.capitalandfinancial.com/en/cf/publications/AsianREITS.pdf 
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further conclude that “architects of new REITs in Asia and elsewhere should consider the 
potential value of organizational forms that provide broad flexibility of financing structure in 
property acquisitions, even if these structures do not provide local tax benefits similar to those 
that the UPREIT structure provides to shareholders of US REITs.” 
 
c. Sponsors’ Substantial Control 
In countries such as Japan and Singapore where external management is most common, agency 
costs between the REIT and manager are mitigated with ownership structures that intersect at the 
sponsor level.  The manager tends to be wholly-owned by the sponsor, which in turn owns a 
substantial portion of a REIT’s outstanding stock.  In absence of the UPREIT structure such as 
the US, the sponsor’s ownership in the REIT provides a positive signal regarding the REIT’s 
future prospects in similar ways with management’s ownership in the UPREIT structure.  
However, the introduction of this structure also introduces new governance issues.   This will be 
discussed in the case study in Section 4. 
 
 
3.4 Role of legislation in driving REIT markets 
 
The US Trajectory 
Since the US Congress introduced REIT legislation in 1960, the growth in market capitalization 
and efficiency of REITs has brought with it much advancement in the legislation. Each major 
growth spurt of the REIT markets was accompanied by legislation.   
 
Summary of Legislative Milestones 
1960 – Congress introduces REIT legislation 
1986 – REIT Modernization Act 
1993 – Relaxation of Five or Fewer Rule 
1999 – Taxable REIT Subsidiaries allowed 
 
REITs grew slowly in the 1970s and 1980s as they their benefits to investors was largely 
eclipsed by Limited Partnerships.  In 1986, the REIT modernization act permitted REITs to be 
self-managed and removed the need to hire an external manager.  This allowed REITs to be 
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much more “active”, integrated corporations.  The key to success in 1990s was growth as the 
ushering in of “mega REITs” occurred.  The demand side equation was helped in 1993 when the 
Five or Fewer Rule for pension fund investment in REITs was relaxed, and hence permitting 
REITs to “look through” a pension fund to count it as a number of investors equal to its 
members.  The relaxation of this rule helped to channel ever more institutional funds into REIT 
vehicles.  Many REITs, previous to the legislation, relied on asset-by-asset acquisitions.  
However the decade of the nineties saw many REITs started to grow faster by merging and 
acquiring other REITs and whole portfolios rather than piecemeal assets.  This consolidation 
brought about large economies of scale in management of the REITs.   
 
The following chart diagrams the path of growth in the number of US REITs and market 
capitalization of US REITs since the 1970s in response to legislation. 
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Figure 7: The 1990s REIT Boom and Modern REIT Era 
 
 
Source: Geltner et Miller 
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In 1999, legislative was signed in by Bill Clinton that allowed REITs to engage in non-REIT 
type activity via Taxable REIT Subsidiaries (“TRS”), in which the subsidiary is subject to 
corporate income tax.  
 
The introduction of TRS has helped to broaden the horizon of REITs and the activities that they 
are permitted to engage in.  TRS have since been used by REIT sponsors for third-party 
management, for development, for specialty financing activities, for managing foreign currency 
gains, as well as for providing other non-customary services21.  Under the TRS regime, the 
aforementioned activities caused the REIT to incur a dealer tax penalty22.  Also the value of a 
REIT'’s TRS cannot exceed more than 20 percent of the gross asset value of the REIT, making 
sure that the REIT's principal focus is on core real estate operations (Bergsman 2005). 
 
Gilbert Menna, chairman of the real estate capital markets practice for Goodwin Procter LLP, 
says about the 1999 legislative act, “It is one of the major milestones in the modernization of the 
REIT vehicle since the adoption of REIT legislation in 1960." Richard Jeanneret, area industry 
leader for Ernst & Young's Mid-Atlantic real estate practice says, "In general, TRS legislation 
has turned out to be a good thing, because lots of REITs have elected to use them to conduct 
businesses that are related to their core operations but were not originally intended under the 
initial REIT legislation. The original REIT legislation was very narrowly focused, but as the real 
estate economy has evolved the law was changed to keep REITs competitive in the real estate 
marketplace."  
 
On the other hand, issues have surfaced with regards to the arms’ length nature of the 
transactions that are conducted between TRS and the parent REIT.  REITs are subject to the 
transfer pricing rules of IRS section 482 that are designed “to allocate the appropriate income 
and expenses between related corporations and to assess interest and penalties against the 
                                                 
 
21
 Refer to Appendix for a sample of US TRS and their activities. 
22
 Dealer status under income test for REITs. Refer to Appendix for REIT qualification criteria for details on the 
income test. 
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corporations for not using arms' length pricing”23.   Under this transfer pricing code, the REIT 
can be susceptible to an excise tax if any transaction between itself and the TRS is not conducted 
at arm's length.   Company stock analysts have noted that important disclosure of information on 
TRS and any subsidiary is important to analyzing the company as a whole.  Disclosure of risk 
and management of the TRS is not always available, a phenomenon that can make investors 
nervous due to the lack of earnings transparency. 
 
Figure 8: Recent US Legislative Changes  
• Changing the measurement of the 10% of sales permitted under the safe harbor test from 
current tax basis to either tax basis or fair market value (at the REIT’s annual option); 
• Increasing the size ceiling for taxable REIT subsidiaries from 20% to 25% of assets; 
• Permitting healthcare REITs to use taxable subsidiaries in the same manner as hotel 
REITs; 
• Excluding most real estate-related foreign currency gains from the computation of the 
REIT income tests;  
• Providing the US Treasury Department with clear authority to rule on whether a variety 
of items are ‘good’ REIT income; 
• The US REIT industry also benefited from terrorism insurance legislation signed into law 
by President George W Bush in late-December 2007. The bill included a seven-year 
extension of the federal government’s terrorism risk insurance backstop, and expanded 
the scope of the law to include both foreign and domestic acts of terrorism. The new 
insurance rules help encourage investment in development projects, stimulating economic 
growth. 
Source: EPRA REIT Report 2008 
 
                                                 
 
23
 NAREIT, Summary of REIT Modernization Proposal, available at:  
http://www.nareit.com/policy/government/sidebyside.cfm 
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Trajectory in Emerging Markets 
Today US REIT legislation has evolved a long way, and markets across the globe have 
developed and advanced in their own legislation.  “Quite simply, the rise and evolution of REITs 
has created a “flat” world when it comes to investing in securitized real estate.” According to 
Eric Corcoran, Managing Editor of the publication, Real Estate Portfolio, who likens the 
progression of REITs to Thomas Friedman’s theory in the best-selling book “The World is 
Flat.” 
 
The market capitalizations of the most mature REIT markets in the Asian region arguably reflect 
the solid regulatory framework provided by their governments to encourage and foster the 
growth of their local REIT markets.   Using Australian Macquarie Bank’s Evolution and Cycle 
of Listed Property and Securities (“ECLIPSE”) model, Whiting (2007) lays out a road map to 
understand the probable evolution of Asian REIT markets.  The ECLIPSE model covers the Asia 
Pacific region which includes the countries in the Asia region plus Australia and New Zealand.  
The ECLIPSE model shows that evolution of the REIT markets are driven by different factors at 
different stages of their growth cycle.  The catalyst for the emerging growth in Stage 1 and 2 is 
broadly seen to be a combination of attempts by owners to gain liquidity from their assets and 
governments’ legislative action.  One of the largest constraints for the REITs to take off is their 
high cost of capital in Stage 1.  The legislative support from governments in these Stages can 
provoke strong share price gains by REITs to move them into the next Stage.  
 
For purposes of this thesis, I will study the legislative efforts of the Singapore REIT markets 
which have progressed considerably from Stage 1 and 2, into Stage 3.  In Stage 3, REITs go 
through a period of acquisition-driven growth where the market prices the REIT’s stock for 
growth.  In turn, with a cost of capital low enough to acquire buildings that are yield- accretive, 
REITs can gain first mover advantage to consolidate their platform of assets.  This stage ends 
when yield accretive acquisitions are difficult to find and REITs start looking to buy abroad.  
 
The ECLIPSE model is shown in the following diagram and more detail can be found in 
Appendix VII. 
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Figure 9: Macquarie ECLIPSE Model 
 
Source: Macquarie 
Singapore 
The regulatory and operating environment of the Singapore REIT (“SREIT”) has undergone 
substantial liberalization over the years.  In 1998, the Monetary Authority Singapore (“MAS”), 
the de-facto central bank of Singapore, released its guidelines on the regulations of real estate 
funds and trusts.  Though legislation was enacted in 1998, SREITs did not take off immediately 
due to weak economic conditions precipitated by the Asian currency crisis.  In October 2001, 
CapitaLand’s first attempt at the IPO of SingMall Property Trust was aborted due to under 
subscription of their US$300 million issue.  The preceding September 11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center did not help investor sentiment either.  It was only in July 2002, that CapitaMall 
successfully held the IPO of the first Singapore REIT. 
 
On the supply side, the role of Singapore government-linked corporations (“GLC”s) in 
catalyzing the growth of the REIT market has been pivotal.   GLCs such as CapitaLand, 
Ascendas, and Mapletree were pioneers in the SREIT market with their successful IPOs.  On the 
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demand side, the government provided a big push via the liberalization of the Central Provident 
Funds (“CPF”) Savings Scheme.   The CPF is a mandatory social security savings scheme 
governed by the CPF Board.  This helped to channel the retirement savings of Singaporeans into 
SREITs.  The Singapore government also helped to increase foreign investor demand of SREITs 
by extending full tax exemptions to foreign investors as well24.   Once it seemed apparent to the 
government that REITs were not taking on excessive risk on behalf of investors, gearing limits for 
REITs were also lifted from initial 25 percent to 35 percent to allow for more aggressive growth.   
Furthermore, REITs that were able to obtain a credit rating were allowed a gearing limit of 60 
percent.  The government’s decision to adopt the more flexible gearing ratio possible allowed the 
market to determine whether the REIT managers have adopted the best business model. 
 
In the US, REIT leverage rose to the 70-80 percent range in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  After the 
real estate downturn of 1989-91, caused in part by the US savings and loan crisis, the market in the 
mid-1990s provided equity in initial public offerings only to those companies that used very 
conservative leverage ratios in the low 30 percent range. Since then, US REITs have produced 
consistent operating results and both the equity markets and the credit rating agencies have become 
comfortable with leverage ratios in the 45-50 percent range.  NAREIT’s opinion is that restricting the 
leverage ratios to a fixed percentage could severely limit a manager’s ability to cope with changed 
economic conditions25. 
 
In its most recent reactive change to market conditions, it was announced in June 2007 that the 
Singapore Takeovers and Mergers Code would be extended to include SREITs.  This has the 
effect of allowing the REIT industry to consolidate and perhaps allow greater economies of 
scale.  Drawing much from the US REIT legislation, the 2007 MAS REIT guidelines brought 
several changes to the original Singapore REIT rules. The new framework introduced the income 
test, enhanced disclosure on short-term yield enhancing arrangements, discouraged arrangements 
that entrench a manager's position, disallowed discounts to institutional investors at IPO and 
                                                 
 
24
 Information on the Singapore CPF is available at www.cpf.gov.sg. 
25
 NAREIT Consulatative paper 
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increased the minimum threshold for investment in real estate (MAS 2007).  These changes have 
all had positive effects in strengthening the governance mechanisms for SREITs. 
 
MAS’s continued revision of the SREIT regulations has created a robust regulatory regime that 
has been reactive to the needs of the SREIT market.  The following timeline summarizes the 
legislative revisions that the government has undertaken.  Ho (2007) remarks that it “reflects 
sustained commitment by the MAS to hone Singapore as the preferred choice for a REIT listing 
in Asia.” 
 
Figure 10: Timeline of SREIT Legislation  
Year Legislative Revision 
2001 Revised SREIT  guidelines and approved tax transparency (dividends taxed at 
individual shareholder’s personal tax rate) 
2002 Usage of Central Provident Funds is allowed for investment in REITs 
2003 Gearing limit of SREIT is increased from 25 to 35 percent 
2004 Full tax exemption for local and foreign investors 
2005 Withholding tax paid by foreigners reduced from 20 percent to 10 percent for five 
years (effective February 2005) 
  Waiver of stamp duty  of 3 percent for five years 
  Gearing limit of SREIT is further  increased from 35 to 60 percent (contingent on 
rating from credit rating agency) 
2007 Licensing regime introduced for REITs managers under the Securities and Futures 
Act ("SFA") 
  Enhanced disclosure requirements 
  Removing the 5% single party limit for investments in real-estate related securities 
  Requiring a REIT to invest at least 75% of its assets in income-producing real estate 
  Extension of Takeover code to REITs to allow easier mergers and acquisitions 
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore and Author’s rewrite 
 
George Noon, an international director at LaSalle Investment Management in Baltimore, says 
“REITs around the globe will grow more akin to the US model as their markets mature and 
investors grow comfortable with that structure.”  For example, the US once required that a REIT 
be externally managed.  That is currently a requirement in parts of Asia, but “will likely be eased 
over time.” 
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CHAPTER 4 - CASE STUDY OF AN ASIAN REIT IPO 
 
4.1 CapitaRetail China Trust 
 
CapitaRetail China Trust (“CRCT”) was listed on the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading 
Limited on 8 December 2006.   CRCT is sponsored by CapitaLand Limited (“CapitaLand” or the 
“Sponsor”), one of the largest listed real estate companies in Asia.    
 
CRCT was established with the investment objective of investing on a long term basis in real estate 
used primarily for retail purposes and located primarily in China, Hong Kong and Macau.  CRCT 
was established as a private trust on 23 October 2006 under a trust deed entered into between 
CapitaRetail China Trust Management Limited (“CRCTML” or the “Manager”) and HSBC 
Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Limited (the “Trustee”).  CRCT’s external manager, 
CRCTML, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CapitaLand.  In addition, CapitaLand maintains a 
substantial ownership in CRCT, as with its other sponsored REITs (see About the Sponsor.) 
 
At IPO, CRCT comprised of seven retail malls with a total of 453,000 square meters, in five Chinese 
cities.  The malls were in Beijing, Huhehaote, Zhengzhou, Shanghai, and Wuhu.  Their anchor 
tenants included strong credit retailers such as Wal-Mart from the US, Carrefour from France and the 
Beijing Hualian Group.  The malls are positioned as one-stop family-oriented shopping, dining and 
entertainment destinations in their localities. CRCT also aims at significant asset enhancement 
opportunities through reconfiguration of retail units, improvement of tenancy mix, conversion of 
ancillary areas into productive retail space and other proactive asset management initiatives26. 
 
CRCT is an example of a cross border REIT.  A cross border REIT is one that invests in real estate 
assets in one or more countries outside its home base.  Therefore, in a cross border REIT, the origin 
of the sponsor is not a relevant factor in determining the cross-border status.  The rationale of a cross 
border REIT has the two-fold benefit of exporting expertise in managing assets and maximizing the 
institutional/ tax advantages in the listing countries.  The Singapore government introduced a tax 
                                                 
 
26
 CRCT Prospectus. Prospectus available at: http://crct.listedcompany.com/misc/ipo.pdf 
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exemption for foreign-sourced interest and foreign trust distributions to encourage more cross border 
REITs to list in the country. This tax exemption attempts to minimize any tax leakage that could 
happen for these vehicles.27 
 
The structure of CRCT, illustrated below in the chart, has some unique characteristics.  The 
structure is a reflection of the Chinese jurisdiction that disallows 100 percent foreign ownership 
of real estate.  A project company is set up for each retail mall in the portfolio.  The project 
company is structured as a Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise (“WFOE”) in China, which holds 
the Chinese assets directly28.  An offshore company is incorporated in Barbados to receive rental 
incomes generated in China and distribute dividends to unit holders.  Barbados is chosen is the 
location of the offshore company due to the tax treaty between China and Barbados that allows 
payments of dividends by a WFOE to its foreign owners to be free of Chinese withholding tax. 
In turn, incomes and expenses are operated as two independent cash flows and netted out once a 
year (Luo, 2008). 
 
There is a unique governance risk that CRCT may not have full control, through the relevant 
Barbados Company, of the project companies in which they don’t hold 100 percent of 
ownership.  As China laws require unanimous approval of the board of the relevant Project 
Company for certain matters, CRCT is subject to the decisions of directors appointed by other 
joint venture partners of the project companies29.  
                                                 
 
27
 Other cross border REITs in Asia include, Fortune REIT, GZI REIT, First REIT, Mapletree-Lippo REIT and 
several others.  Majority of the cross border REITs are based in Singapore. 
28
 A WFOE is a limited liability company wholly owned by foreign investor(s) typically with a limited duration.  In 
China, WFOEs were originally conceived of for encouraging manufacturing activities that were either export 
orientated or that introduced advanced technology. However, with China's entry into the WTO, these conditions 
were gradually abolished and the WFOE is increasingly being used for service providers such as a variety of 
consulting and management services, software development and trading as well. The liability of the shareholders of 
the WFOE is limited to the amount of subscribed capital. 
29 The matters needing unanimous approval of the board include the amendment of the relevant Project Company’s 
articles of association, the increase or reduction or transfer of the registered capital of the relevant Project 
Company, the merger or division of the relevant Project company and the winding up of the relevant Project 
Company. 
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Figure 11: CapitaRetail China Trust Structure 
 
Source: CapitaRetail China Trust Prospectus, 2006. 
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About the Sponsor – CapitaLand Limited 
CapitaLand, a public company traded on the Singapore Stock Exchange, manages more than 
S$50 billion of assets, including over S$24 billion in 5 REITs and 17 private equity real estate 
funds.  Temasek Holdings, one of Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Funds, owns 40 percent of 
CapitaLand, hence, categorizing CapitaLand as a government-linked corporation (“GLC”).  
GLCs are companies in which more than 20% of their shares are owned by the Singapore 
government.  Most of these companies were established in the 1960s and 70s, primarily to 
facilitate Singapore’s economic development in specific sectors. 30 
 
CapitaLand is also involved in other retail property business through CapitaLand Retail Limited, 
the retail property arm and wholly-owned subsidiary of CapitaLand, the two retail private equity 
funds that CapitaLand manage, CapitaRetail China Development Fund and CapitaRetail China 
Incubator Fund, and the Singapore retail asset REIT, CapitaMall Trust. 
 
CapitaLand, at the time of CRCT’s IPO, had established three pioneering REITs listed in 
Singapore — (1) CapitaMall Trust,  the first REIT in Singapore, (2) CapitaCommercial Trust,  
the first commercial REIT in Singapore and (3) Ascott Residence Trust, the first serviced 
residence REIT in Asia.  The following is the corporate structure of CapitaLand.31 
 
                                                 
 
30
 The Temasek Charter issued by the Singapore government on July 3, 2002 divides GLC (government-linked 
companies) that will continue to be owned and controlled by Temasek into Group A and Group B businesses. Group 
A businesses are those that involve either “ownership of a resource that is critical to Singapore’s security or 
economic well-being” or “a natural domestic monopoly for which a market-based regulatory framework has not yet 
been established” and Group B businesses are those with regional and international potential.  
31
 Refer to Appendix X for more information on the Sponsor. 
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Figure 12: CapitaLand Limited Corporate Structure 
 
 
As mentioned, CapitaLand maintains partial ownership in each of their sponsored REITs.  The 
percentage ownership maintained in each REIT is shown below.  
 
Figure 13: CapitaLand REIT ownership 
 
Source: CapitaLand corporate website 
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4.2 Performance and Valuation at IPO 
 
As at 30 September 2006, the assets held by CRCT were valued at RMB 3, 792,000,000 
(S$757,021,029) by Knight Frank, the independent appraiser appointed by the Trustee.  The 
valuation was used as basis for the initial offering price of S$1.13 per unit.  The institutional tranche 
of CRCT's IPO was 196 times over-subscribed32. 
 
At the date of the global offering, more than 282,000,000 units were distributed to five strategic 
investors at S$0.981 per share. Institutional investor constitutes 59.4% of the ownership while 
individual investor accounts for the rest 40.6%. 
 
The following table and charts show the summary valuation statistics at time of CRCT’s IPO and 
CRCT’s post-IPO performance. 
 
Figure 14: Summary Valuation Statistics 
 
(1) The implied purchase price of the Properties is derived from the Offering Price (as defined herein) which 
includes the total Underwriting, Selling and Management Commissions, as well as other estimated offering 
expenses. Such expenses have been paid by the Vendor and the other Strategic Investors to the Trustee when they 
subscribed for Units as a Strategic Investor during the private trust stage. 
 
 
                                                 
 
32
 This does not include the strategic investors. 
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Figure 15: CRCT Performance since IPO (8 Dec 2006) to 30 March 2007 
 
 
Figure 16: Summary of CRCT 1Q2007 Results 
 
1. The forecast is based on the forecast shown in CRCT Prospectus (the “Prospectus”) dated 29 November 2006. 
2. YTD 2007 includes private trust period from 23 October 2006 to 7December 2006 (“Private Trust Period”) and public 
trust period from the date of listing on 8 December2006 (“Listing Date”) to 31 March 2007. 
3. As disclosed in the Prospectus, the first distribution after the Listing Date will be for the period from the Listing Date to 
30June 2007 and will be paid by the manager on or before 30 September 2007. 
4. .N.M.-not meaningful 
 
Source: CRCT Prospectus and CRCT 1Q2007 Results 
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CRCT’s income available for distribution 1Q 2007 was S$7.17 million.  This was S$0.63 million 
or 9.5% higher than the forecast per CRCT’s prospectus. 
 
Since listing in December 2006, CRCT’s unit price has appreciated by a remarkable 176.1%33 
from its initial offering price of S$1.13 per unit.  This compares more than favorably with other 
broader indices like the Straits Times Index and the Singapore Property Equities Index, which 
had risen 11.4% and 29.3% in the corresponding period respectively.  While the strong share 
price performance is partly attributable to investors’ confidence in “the long-term strategy which 
is well-supported by a proprietary pipeline of assets and proven on-ground delivery capabilities”, 
as quoted by chairman of CRCTML another underlying reason for strong share price 
performance may be in part due to investors’ confidence in the governance structures of the 
REIT. 
 
The following section examines the corporate governance mechanisms in place for CRCT and 
contrasts them with the US REIT corporate governance mechanisms that were discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
 
4.3 CRCT Governance Mechanisms v. US REIT Governance Mechanisms 
 
i. Board Structure and Composition 
 
There is no separate board for CRCT, but an executive committee and audit committee.  Hence 
in examining the corporate governance of the board of CRCT, it is most relevant to use the board 
of the manager, CRCTML, as the proxy.  The board of CRCTML established a framework for 
the management of the CRCTML and CRCT, including a system of internal control and a 
business risk management process.  CRCTML follows the unitary or one-tier board structure 
commonly used in the US where the emphasis is on the unit holder.   
 
The following is a statement of the board: 
                                                 
 
33 Based on CRCT closing unit price of S$3.12 on 30 March 2007   
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The Board of Directors of the manager is responsible for the overall corporate 
governance of the Manager including establishing goals for management and monitoring 
the achievement of these goals. The Manager is also responsible for the strategic business 
direction and risk management of CRCT. All Board members participate in matters 
relating to corporate governance, business operations and risks, financial performance 
and the nomination and review of Directors (CRCT Prospectus). 
 
 
The board structure and composition of CRCTML entails:  
• Four Independent Directors, one Executive Director and four Non-Executive Directors. 
• The Executive Director holds the position of Chief Executive Officer of CRCTML.  
• The positions of Chairman of the board and CEO are separate.  
• There are separate Audit and Compensation Committees. 
 
The separation of the roles of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer provides a healthy 
professional relationship between the Board and the management of CRCTML, with clarity of 
roles and robust oversight as they deliberate on the business activities of the manager.  The 
Chairman is responsible for the overall management of the Board, as well as ensuring that the 
members of the Board and the management work together with integrity and competency, and 
that the Board engages the management in constructive debate on strategy, business operations, 
enterprise risk and other plans while the Chief Executive Officer has full executive 
responsibilities over the business directions and operational decisions in the day-to-day 
management of the Manager.34 
 
A board system with majority non-executive or independent members has the benefit of allowing 
the management to benefit from external, diverse and objective perspective on issues that are 
brought before the board.    The candidates for the board are put forward or sought through an 
informal/formal contacts and recommendations.  According to the manager, “It would also 
enable the board to interact and work with the management through a robust exchange of ideas 
and views to help shape the strategic process.”  While having the majority of the directors that 
are either non-executive or independent of the management of CRCTML has the above benefits, 
                                                 
 
34 CRCT Prospectus 2006. 
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it appears that the directors are independent of CRCTML, but not completely independent of 
CapitaLand – the parent and the sponsor.  Closer inspections of the biographies of the directors 
show that many of them also either hold other positions with CapitaLand or sit on boards of 
other CapitaLand affiliates.  There is little or no governance in place to prevent the directors 
from sacrificing the performance of one CapitaLand-sponsored REIT for another CapitaLand-
sponsored REIT.  This is an area that could benefit from more disclosure.  A reform of 
regulations could help set some the tone for increasing the measure of independence or at least 
allow minority shareholders as a bloc to appoint directors, and have a say with regards to the 
directors’ ongoing appointment. 
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Figure 17: List of CRCTML Directors and Other Appointments Held 
Name of Director Board Position Other Appointment (s) with  
CapitaLand and/or its Affiliates  
Mr. Hsuan Owyang Chairman and 
Independent Director 
None 
Mr. Liew Mun Leong Deputy Chairman and 
Non-Executive Director 
- Group President and CEO of CapitaLand  
- Deputy Chairman of The Ascott Group 
Limited, Raffles Holdings Limited, CapitaMall 
Trust Management Limited, CapitaCommercial 
Trust Management Limited and Ascott 
Residence Trust Management Limited 
Mr Lim Beng Chee Executive Director and 
Chief Executive Officer 
- Chief Investment Officer and Head, Group 
Investments and Asset Management of 
CapitaLand Retail Limited 
Mr. Victor Liew Cheng San Independent Director None 
Ms. Chew Gek Khim Independent Director None 
Mr Dilhan Pillay 
Sandrasegara 
Independent Director None 
Mr. Kee Teck Koon Non-Executive Director - Deputy Chairman of CapitaLand Commercial, 
Integrated Development Limited, CapitaLand 
Retail Limited and CapitaLand Financial 
Limited. 
- Director of CapitaCommercial Trust 
Management Limited and CapitaMall Trust 
Management Limited 
Mr Olivier Lim Tse Ghow Non-Executive Director - Group CFO of CapitaLand  
- Non-Executive Director of CapitaCommercial 
Trust Management Limited and CapitaMall 
Trust Management Limited 
- Alternate Director of The Ascott Group 
Limited 
Mr Pua Seck Guan Non-Executive Director - CEO of CapitaMall Trust Management 
Limited, CapitaLand Retail Limited and 
CapitaLand Financial Limited 
Total 9 (4 Non- Executive, 4 Independent, 1 Chairman (Independent) 
 
 
In the US, REITs span the range from large capitalization public REITs with efficient, fully integrated 
operations, to private REITs closely held by founding members.  REITs of the former nature or REITs 
with aspirations for institutional inflows of capital typically have boards that have higher percentage of 
independent directors to provide stronger non-executive oversight on behalf of investors. 
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The following diagram shows the management reporting structure of the board. 
 
Figure 18: Management Reporting Structure of the Board 
 
Source: CRCT Prospectus 
 
Pro: Separation of roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer to provide check and balance 
for the management of CRTCML. 
Con: The board consists of directors that also hold board positions in other REITs that are 
sponsored by CapitaLand.  Disclosure of individual incentives is not clear. 
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ii. Ownership 
 
More than half of the units issued for the CRCT IPO were to strategic investors at a discount to 
the S$1.13 public price.  The strategic investors  -- the Vendor, Retail Crown Pte Ltd, CapitaMall 
Trust (“CMT”), Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke 
Belangen (“PGGM”), and Great Eastern Life – were issued units at a price of S$0.98135.   The 
practice of extending discounts to the public offering price for strategic institutional investors has 
since been prohibited by the Monetary Authority of Singapore in 2007.  While REIT managers 
contend that the discounts allow them to establish a stable investor base, the MAS’ rationale for 
the change is that the differential pricing would disadvantage retail investors.  
 
In the US, differential treatment of shareholders exists with different classes of investors.  In the 
UPREIT structure, holders of partnership units and REIT stock are accorded different control 
and cash flow rights.  In the case of the CRCT IPO, none of the strategic investors were granted 
any special rights under the trust deed distinct from the rights enjoyed by any other unit holder 
under the trust deed.  The use of preferred shareholdings can be used by SREITs, but is not in the 
case of CRCT. 
 
 At IPO (assuming that the over-allotment option was not exercised) strategic investors 
constituted 59.4% of the ownership while other public and institutional investors accounted for 
40.6%.  Comparing the US REIT ownership rules of five-or-fewer to the CRCT IPO, CRCT is 
consistent with this rule in diversifying its ownership base to have at least five investors hold 
                                                 
 
35 
The strategic investors are: 
1. Retail Crown Pte. Ltd. (20%) 
2.The Vendor (6.1%): both the Vendor and the Retail Crown Pte. Ltd. are owned indirectly by the Sponsor – 
CapitaLand Limited - through CRTL and CapitaLandRetail China. 
3.CMT (20%) is the first real estate investment trust to be listed on the SGX-ST 
4.PGGM (10%) is a pension fund for employees in the healthcare and social welfare sectors which was established 
in 1969 in the Netherlands. The pension fund invests largely in fixed income, equities, private equity, real estate and 
commodities, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere. 
5.Great Eastern (3.3%) is the largest insurance group in Singapore and Malaysia. It is the only life insurance 
company to be listed on the SGX-ST, and the largest insurance company in Southeast Asia in terms of assets and 
market capitalization. 
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50% of the outstanding units of the REIT36.  The Singapore REIT law requires that at least 25% 
of the outstanding units much be held by at least 500 public shareholders, a variant of the five-or-
fewer law in the US – prior to this IPO it was also expected that CRCT would be consistent with 
this law. 
 
The following table sets out the principal unit holders of CRCT and their unit holdings. 
 
Figure 19: Ownership of CRCT Units 
 
Source: CRCT Prospectus 
 
After the IPO, the sponsor, CapitaLand, through its holdings via Retail Crown and the Vendor, 
had an interest of at least 20% of the units, helping to align its interest with those of the other 
unit holders.  CapitaLand also had an additional indirect shareholding in CRCT through its 
                                                 
 
36
 As a pension fund, PGGM is considered to qualify through the look through provisions of constituting more than 
one single investor.   
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partial ownership of CMT, further increasing its stake in CRCT’s performance.  As an extra 
signal of faith to the investors, the sponsor has also set in place two lock-up periods for its units.  
The first lock-up period is with respect to all the units held by the sponsor and spans 180 days 
after the initial public offering date.  The second lock-up period is with respect to half the units 
held by the sponsor and spans 360 days after the first lock-up period. 37 
 
In Singapore, REIT sponsors often retain substantial control of SREIT shares after IPOs and an 
independent asset management subsidiary is typically set up by sponsors to render fee-based 
management services to REITs.  In essence, CapitaLand is able to benefit from both equity 
participation in their sponsored REIT and the management fees related to each REIT.  These 
REITs are commonly known as captive REITs.  In the US, the close relationship between 
sponsors and management companies in captive REITs creates potential sources of agency 
problems, which include over-paying for properties unloaded by sponsors.  Given the high 
agency costs associated with captive REITs, evidence in the US has pointed to the significant 
underperformance of captive REITs.   
 
CapitaLand attempts to re-align the interests of the sponsors and investors by continuing to hold 
stakes in their sponsored REITs.  These controlling stakes of CapitaLand can be construed as a 
strong signal on the part of CapitaLand to act in good faith so as to preserve its reputation, and at 
the same time, minimize the financial and operational risks in REITs. Outside investors also 
acknowledge this signal and put their confidence into the REITs with controlling stakes from 
sponsors.  While the external management fee-based structure of CapitaLand presents agency 
costs, CapitaLand’s equity participation in CRCT helps to mitigate these associated costs.   
Assurance is also additionally offered by the Singapore government’s investment in the REIT 
sector via CapitaLand (whose majority owner is Temasek Holdings)  
                                                 
 
37
 The Sponsor has agreed to (a) a lock-up arrangement during the period commencing from 6 November 2006 until 
the date falling 180 days after the Listing Date (both dates inclusive) (the “First Lock-up Period”) in respect of all 
of the Units held by the Sponsor from the date  and (b) a lock-up arrangement during the period commencing from 
the day immediately following the First Lock-up Period until the date falling 360 days after the Listing Date (the 
“Second Lock-up Period”) in respect of 50.0% of the Lock-up Units, subject to certain exceptions. 
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Pros:  Consistent alignment of sponsor’s interest with REIT shareholders through significant 
sponsor’s stake in CRCT.  Shareholder ownership base is diversified according to the equivalent 
five-or-fewer rule. 
Cons:  High ownership of REIT by sponsor makes it hard for investors to distinguish between 
the share price movements of the REIT with that of the sponsor.   
 
iii. Compensation  
 
Compensation can refer to salary and bonus paid to individuals of the REIT, as well as, 
management fees paid to the REIT manager.  In the case of CRCT, the most important measure 
to be evaluated in terms of corporate governance is that of the external REIT manager, 
CRCTML.  Externally-managed REITs face unique agency costs that require that the flows of 
services and funds between the REIT and the manager to be transparent. 
 
The fees that CRCTML is entitled to include a base fee of 0.25% per annum on the value of 
CRCT’s deposited property38, a performance fee of 4.00% per annum of the Net Property 
Income in relevant financial year, an investment management fee of 0.5% of the value of 
authorized investments39, an acquisition fee of 1.0-1.5% (depending on size of investment)40, and 
a divestment fee of 0.5% of the sale price of assets.  These fees are consistent with the industry 
standard in Singapore.  In the US, these costs of these activities are internalized within the REIT. 
 
                                                 
 
38 
Excluding investments in the nature of real estate held directly by CRCT or indirectly through one or more 
Special Purpose Vehicles 
39
 Authorized Investments which are not real estate either held directly or indirectly (unless such Authorized 
Investment, which is not real estate, is an interest in a property fund (either a real estate investment trust or private 
property fund) wholly managed by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Sponsor for which no Authorized Investment 
Management Fee will be payable). 
40
 (i) up to 1.5% of the purchase price in the case of any Authorized Investment acquired by CRCT for less than 
S$200.0 million and (ii) 1.0% of the purchase price in the case of any Authorized Investment acquired by CRCT for 
S$200.0 million or more 
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Figure 20: Fees payable to CRCTML 
     Base Fee  Performance Fee 
Investment 
Mgt Fee 
 Acquisition Fee   Divestment Fee 
0.25% 
per annum 
4.00% 
per annum 
0.5% 
of value 
1.0-1.5% 
of value 
0.5% 
of value 
 
As an additional check and balance to these fees, any increase in the rate above the permitted 
limit or any change in the structure of these fees must be approved by a resolution proposed and 
passed by a majority consisting of 75.0% or more of the total number of votes cast for and 
against such resolution at a meeting of the unit holders.  The disclosure and transparency of the 
compensation structure ensure that any arrangements not beneficial to unit holders can be 
discovered.  Ongoing monitoring is also facilitated by regular financial statements publicly 
issued. 
 
As set forth earlier, compensation, like ownership-related practices, help define incentives and 
whether the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned and whether the board is an 
effective check on management.  For CapitaLand, the management fees payable to the manager, 
CRCTML have a performance-based element which is designed to align the interests of the 
Manager with those of the unit holders, and incentivize CRCTML to grow revenues and 
minimize operating costs.   
 
However, it should also be noted that there may be difficulty in removing CRCTML as the 
manager of CRCT.  Given that the Singapore Property Funds Guidelines require the removal of a 
Manager of a real estate investment trust to be approved by the unit holders by way of passing an 
ordinary resolution, without any unit holder being disenfranchised or deprived the right to vote.   
Hence, it may be difficult for the manager (being an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
Sponsor) to be removed. 
 
In the US experience, analysts for Moody’s have found that external management structures 
effectively lock REITs into outsourcing management services to a particular external manager, 
and create real barriers to change. Externally managed REITs have few, if any, employees.  
Instead, the external manager provides employees to the REIT as part of the services agreement.  
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Such a structure presents a major obstacle to REITs if they wish to cancel the services agreement 
with the external manager, because such a change requires a wholesale change in management 
and the employees at large41.  With CRCT, the entangling of the manager and the REIT is most 
apparent due to their common owner. 
 
Pros: Performance-based fees to align the interests of CRCTML with investors in CRCT. 
Con: Difficulty in removing CRCTML as manager of CRCT due to ownership of both entities 
being linked at a higher level. 
 
iv. Takeover Defenses 
 
CRCT, like all REITs, in Singapore do not have poison pill provisions, which generally reflect 
negatively on a company’s stock price.  In the time of the IPO of CRCT, the rights of minority 
shareholders were not protected by the REIT legislation or provisions written into CRCT’s 
governance.   
 
The prevailing standards in the Singapore REIT IPO market at that time were consistently 
lacking in takeover defenses.  At the time of IPO, the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
and the provisions of Sections 138 to 140 of the Singapore Securities and Futures Act did not 
apply to acquisitions of SREIT units.  Hence, the rights of the unit holders of CRCT were not 
identical to those granted to holders of shares in companies incorporated in Singapore.   
 
                                                 
 
41
 “Corporate Governance of Externally Managed REITs Presents Credit Risks” by Moody’s, November 200.7 
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In June 2007, a change was made to extend the legislation to include SREITs.  The change not 
only protects the interests of minority investors but also that of the incumbent controlling unit 
holders. In the absence of a proper framework governing take-over and merger transactions of 
REITs, a party would be able to accumulate effective control of a REIT without having to make 
a general offer. Under such circumstances, incumbent controlling unit holders might not be able 
to extract a control premium from such party.  The amendment has forced acquirers to engage in 
negotiation with the REIT and help preserve the value of unit holders’ investment.  The 
Singapore legislation now more closely resembles that of the UK, Australia and US. 
 
Pro:  New legislation provide some minority and controlling shareholder protections. 
Con:  Initial legislation failed to protect interests of minority investors; however, this was later 
mitigated by the change in legislation in June 2007. 
 
v. Other – Related Party Transactions 
 
The nature of the contractual agreements between the sponsor, CapitaLand, the manager, 
CRCTML, and the REIT, CRCT, can lead to non- arm’s-length transactions, or self-dealing.  
This is especially pronounced in the case of CRCT and other externally managed REITs where 
the parties are all distinct entities with distinct economic incentives.  These incentives may or 
may not overlap.  In mitigating the conflict of interest that can arise, CRCT has put in place 
certain important contractual agreements with CapitaLand and CRCTML. 
 
First, CRCTML may not manage any other REIT which invests in the same type of properties as 
CRCT. Second, the right of first refusal (ROFR”) over acquisition of properties from related 
parties is extended to CRCT.  This contractual arrangement helps to mitigate the conflict of 
interest that arises from the similar businesses that CapitaLand also operates.   The ROFR is for 
properties in two CapitaLand-sponsored private retail property funds, namely, CapitaRetail 
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China Development Fund42 and CapitaRetail China Incubator Fund43, and also properties under 
CapitaLand Retail Limited44, the retail property arm and wholly-owned subsidiary of 
CapitaLand. 
 
To enforce the above, CRCTML has established an internal control system to ensure that all 
future related party transactions will be undertaken on “normal commercial terms and will not be 
prejudicial to the interests of CRCT and the unit holders.”  
 
As a general rule, the Manager must demonstrate to its Audit Committee that such transactions 
satisfy the foregoing criteria, which may entail obtaining (where practicable) quotations from 
parties unrelated to the Manager, or obtaining one or more valuations or appraisal reports from 
independent professional valuers (in accordance with the Singapore Property Funds Guidelines). 
 
In case of CRCT, the role of the audit committee is particularly important due to many 
opportunities for self-dealing to occur between the related parties.  CRCT’s prospectus specifies 
that the audit committee will review all related party transactions to ensure compliance with 
CRCTML’s internal control system and with the relevant provisions of the Singapore Listing 
Manual, as well as, the Property Funds Guidelines. The review is to include the examination of 
the nature of the transaction and its supporting documents. If a member of the audit committee 
                                                 
 
42
 CapitaRetail China Development Fund (“Development Fund”) is a private fund established by CapitaLand to 
invest primarily in greenfield retail mall developments in China. It has raised a committed capital of US$600.0 
million and will grant a right of first refusal to CRCT over properties which it proposes to sell.  Pursuant to its joint 
venture with Shenzhen International Trust & Investment Co., Ltd (“SZITIC”), CapitaLand has secured for 
investment by the Development Fund, a portfolio of 19 retail mall developments across China, comprising over 
900,000 sq m of aggregate gross floor area and an aggregate value of approximately US$900.0 million with SZITIC 
and its subsidiaries and associates (the “SZITIC Group”).  
 
43 CapitaRetail China Incubator Fund (“Incubator Fund”), another private fund established by CapitaLand to 
warehouse completed retail malls in the PRC for repositioning, asset enhancement or leasing to increase occupancy 
rates and which has raised committed capital of US$425.0 million, will grant a right of first refusal to CRCT over 
properties which it proposes to sell.  
 
44 
CapitaLand, through its retail property arm and wholly-owned subsidiary, CapitaLand Retail Limited (“CRTL”), 
will grant first to CRCT, and then to the Incubator Fund, a right of first refusal over future completed retail 
properties located in China which are identified and targeted for acquisition by CRTL or its subsidiaries. 
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has an interest in a transaction, he or she is to abstain from participating in the review and 
approval process in relation to that transaction45. 
 
For all related-party transactions, strong disclosure requirements by CRCT are enforceable.  The 
CRCT prospectus mandates that CRCTML is to maintain a register to record all Related Party 
Transactions which are entered into by CRCT and the basis, including any quotations from 
unrelated parties and independent valuations obtained to support such bases, on which they are 
entered into. This is a positive signal to investors of transparency.  REITs in Singapore are 
increasingly moving to this standard. 
 
While CRCTML has put in place governance structures to make sure that these conflicts are 
handled in the “best” manner possible, there may be technical, regulatory or informational 
reasons why the agency problem can’t be completely solved with the externally managed REIT 
structure.  However, regardless of the REIT management structure, there should be as much 
disclosure as possible to mitigate the conflict.  If the governance system is better relative to other 
SREITs, then there will assume to be a premium conferred by the market. 
 
Until 1986, internal management of REITs was not permitted in the US.  However, once the 
REIT legislation was amended to allow for internal management, most REITs restructured 
themselves to be self managed while new REITs predominantly picked the internal management 
structure.  While literature in the US supports the view that internal management is more 
efficient, the institutional setting of the new REITs in Asia and their success will support the 
dominant model of the future.  Both formats should be allowed in letting the market decide 
which one preferred. 
 
Pros: Right of first refusal extended to CRCT.  Audit committee to provide oversight of any 
related party transactions. High level of transparency and disclosure frequency. 
                                                 
 
45
 CRCT Prospectus. 
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Con:  Agency costs can’t be completely resolved, only mitigated with appropriate governance 
structures and monitoring mechanisms.  Often the ultimate decision is based on the trade-offs 
between higher efficiency and higher costs of providing transparency. 
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION  
 
Corporate governance structures are essential for a well-developed, functioning marketplace.  
The presence of a good, effective corporate governance system helps to instill confidence in the 
market and facilitate a more information-efficient economy, both of which are the underpinnings 
of economic growth, whether in Asia or globally.  Many Asian countries have transparency 
problem that inhibit international investment inflows.  According to Jones Lang LaSalle’s Real 
Estate Transparency Index, only Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia are ranked as high as Tier 
Two in Asia.  Other Asian countries are reckoned to have very serious transparency problems 
and are classified in Tiers Three through Five.  The US is ranked in Tier One.   
 
On the firm level, the design of sound corporate governance mechanisms is critical for REITs 
that are preparing to go public.  At the industry level, issues of transparency and corporate 
governance are consequential to the further development of REITs in Asia.  This study looks at 
various REIT regimes and corporate governance systems around the world.  It then proceeds to 
examine the governance structures in place at the time of an IPO in the emerging REIT market of 
Singapore. 
 
The case study of one of CapitaLand’s REIT vehicles, CapitaRetail China Trust, highlights the 
differences that still exist between the US and evolving Asian REIT models and in turn, the 
relevant corporate governance structures.   Importantly, this study finds that governance 
structures are not a “one size fits all” theory and must be tailored to fit the appropriate 
institutional context.   
 
Several corporate governance mechanisms were examined in CRCT’s IPO to find their 
connection to a firm’s value.  It was found that while the separation of roles of Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer to provide check and balance for the management of CRTCML was an 
advantage, the board should attempt to provide higher disclosure of each individual’s director’s 
incentives as to their multiple board positions in other REITs sponsored by CapitaLand.  A more 
diverse and independent board could better help to protect the interests of the shareholder base.   
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The shareholder ownership base of CRCT at IPO was also found to be appropriately diversified 
according to the equivalent five-or-fewer rule from the US.  However, the high ownership of 
CRCT by CapitaLand makes it hard for investors to distinguish between the share price 
movements of the REIT with that of the sponsor.  It would appear that in the absence of more 
distinct governance structures that much of investors’ assurance is offered by the faith of the 
Singapore government’s dollars behind the REIT sector.   The Singapore government owns a 
significant stake in CapitaLand, via the state investment fund, Temasek, which in turns holds 40 
percent of CapitaLand’s equity.  CapitaRetail China Trust is part of a group of pioneering REITs 
in Asia that helped to set benchmarks for other countries to follow.  The assurance of the 
Singapore government has greatly helped to foster growth in SREITs; however as the market 
matures and the number of private players entering increase, governance structures will need to 
evolve to match the different institutional context of these new SREITs.    
 
External management format in the case of CRCT creates agency costs, some of which can be 
mitigated with contractual arrangements such as a right of first refusal on deals, strong audit 
standards, and a high level of transparency and disclosure frequency.  CapitaLand’s substantial 
equity participation in CRCT may help to mitigate the associated agency costs with the external 
fee-based manager.  New SREITs may not be able the duplicate the same ownership and cross 
holding structures of CapitaLand, in which case stronger clauses should be written in to allow 
shareholders the ability to remove the external manager when appropriate.  While external 
management is most prevalent, this situation is not a static one as governments in the region have 
proved their ability to adapt quickly to the market’s needs.  Legislation should be reformed to 
allow both internal and external structures to exist, thus encouraging the market to make its 
choice in terms of the preferred management format.  Currently of the emerging REIT markets, 
only Hong Kong allows both formats. 
 
The closely-held nature and cross-shareholding structures between CapitaLand’s REIT vehicles, 
in aligning interests of sponsor, management REIT shareholders, have been able to mitigate the 
agency costs of external management thus far.  However with the introduction of new players, 
the possibility of new management formats and ownership structure, and the increasing investor 
participation in REITs as an asset class, more protection for minority shareholders will be 
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needed.   REITs should be required to implement a voting system which ensures that at least one 
member of the board of directors be appointed out of a list of candidates to be submitted by 
minority shareholders.  Additionally as a remedial measure, minority shareholders should be able 
to initiate liability action against directors if they were not found to be acting in the best interests 
of shareholders. 
 
Agency costs can’t be completely resolved, only mitigated with appropriate governance 
structures and monitoring mechanisms. As an investment vehicle, REITs have leveled the 
playing field for access to real estate for investors all around the world.   With the fastest 
urbanization rates in the world, the potential for the shift of real estate from the private to public 
realm in Singapore and the rest of Asia is tremendous.  However, when it comes to corporate 
governance, is the world truly flat? The institutional context in which US REITs and emerging 
REITs originate is unique and different.  Even within each emerging REIT country in Asia, the 
context is also different.   Singapore’s landscape is one dominated by a high percentage of GLCs.  
Hong Kong’s landscape has its own brand of small government, low taxes capitalism to which 
REITs might not necessarily offer tax advantages for investors.  Thailand’s, Korea’s, and 
Malaysia’s landscape are all typically dominated by a handful of family-controlled 
conglomerates.  The most appropriate governance structure is one that both allows REITs to 
flourish, protect shareholders, and in turn rewards these same shareholders.  Regardless of the 
ultimate choice of governance structure, transparency and disclosure are always going to be the 
cornerstones of the mechanisms.   
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APPENDIX I: US REIT Qualification Criteria 
(Source: EPRA REIT Report 2008) 
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APPENDIX II: Average Corporate Governance Quotient Ranked by Industry 
Source: Risk Metrics Group as of June 2, 2008 
 
Industry Group Average Index CGQ 
Utilities  68.9 
Real Estate  56.4 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences  55.5 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment  54.3 
Health Care Equipment & Services  52.4 
Banks  52.2 
Automobiles & Components  51.6 
Capital Goods  50.8 
Insurance  50.6 
Materials  50.5 
Technology Hardware & Equipment  50.5 
AVERAGE  50.2 
Transportation  50.2 
Commercial Services & Supplies  49.3 
Food & Staples Retailing  48.4 
Software & Services  48.1 
Retailing  47.7 
Telecommunication Services  47.2 
Diversified Financials  47 
Consumer Durables & Apparel  46.8 
Consumer Services  45.6 
Energy  45.2 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco  40.8 
Household & Personal Products  38.3 
Media  36.4 
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APPENDIX III: Top 50 US Real Estate Companies, Ranked by Industry CGQ  
Source: Risk Metrics Group as of June 2, 2008 
 
Company Name  Ticker  Industry CGQ 
Developers Diversified Realty Corp.  DDR  100 
Regency Centers Corp.  REG  99.5 
AMB Property Corp.  AMB  99 
Parkway Properties, Inc.  PKY  98.5 
U-Store-it Trust  YSI  98.1 
Apartment Investment & Management Co.  AIV  97.6 
The St. Joe Company  JOE  97.6 
Rayonier Inc.  RYN  96.6 
Highwoods Properties, Inc.  HIW  96.1 
UDR, Inc.  UDR  95.6 
BRE Properties, Inc.  BRE  95.1 
Duke Realty Corporation  DRE  94.7 
Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust  PEI  94.2 
Ventas, Inc.  VTR  93.7 
Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc.  PCL  93.2 
Acadia Realty Trust  AKR  92.7 
ProLogis  PLD  92.2 
Cousins Properties Inc.  CUZ  91.7 
Colonial Properties Trust  CLP  91.3 
Liberty Property Trust  LRY  90.8 
Equity Residential  EQR  90.3 
Brandywine Realty Trust  BDN  89.8 
Nationwide Health Properties, Inc.  NHP  89.3 
Rait Financial Trust  RAS  88.8 
PS Business Parks, Inc.  PSB  88.3 
Entertainment Properties Trust  EPR  87.9 
Lasalle Hotel Properties  LHO  87.4 
CB Richard Ellis Group Inc  CBG  86.9 
HCP Inc.  HCP  86.4 
Felcor Lodging Trust Incorporated  FCH  85.9 
First Potomac Realty Trust  FPO  85.4 
Federal Realty Investment Trust  FRT  85 
Northstar Realty Finance Corp  NRF  84.5 
EastGroup Properties, Inc.  EGP  84 
Anworth Mortgage Asset Corp.  ANH  83.5 
National Retail Properties, Inc.  NNN  83 
Cedar Shopping Centers, Inc.  CDR  82.5 
Diamondrock Hospitality Company  DRH  82 
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Company Name  Ticker  Industry CGQ 
Health Care REIT, Inc.  HCN  81.6 
Taubman Centers, Inc.  TCO  81.1 
American Campus Communities, Inc.  ACC  80.6 
Corporate Office Properties Trust, Inc.  OFC  80.1 
Lexington Realty Trust  LXP  79.6 
DCT Industrial Trust Inc.  DCT  79.1 
Redwood Trust, Inc.  RWT  78.6 
Simon Property Group, Inc.  SPG  78.2 
Getty Realty Corp.  GTY  77.7 
Post Properties, Inc.  PPS  77.2 
American Financial Realty Trust  AFR  76.7 
Jones Lang LaSalle, Inc.  JLL  76.2 
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APPENDIX IV: REIT Measures in the Global Market  
Source: Ernst and Young: Global REIT Report 2008 
 
1. Market Capitalization  - Total per Region 
 
 
2.  Market Capitalization Average per REIT 
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3. Total rate of return − one year to 30 June 2008 
 
4. Total rate of return − three year to 30 June 2008 
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5. Total debt to gross assets 
 
6. Premium/discount of market price to net assets 
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7. Regional dividend yield 
 
8. Beta 
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APPENDIX V: Legal Review of Asian REIT Regimes  
(Source: Luo Master’s Thesis 2008) 
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APPENDIX VI:  External Management Governance Risks and Mitigating Factors 
Source: Moody’s 
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APPENDIX VII:  Overview of Typical REIT Management Structures by Country/Region 
Source: Moody’s 
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APPENDIX VIII: Sampling of Taxable REIT Subsidiaries in the US 
Source: Real Estate Portfolio Magazine 
 
American Investment & Management Co. (NYSE: AIV) 
Purpose: On average, AIMCO has used 155 entities a year from 2001 to present in order to 
provide asset management or financial management of properties as well as non-customary 
services to properties and tenants, such as food service, recording studios, health clubs and 
convenience stores. Additionally, AIMCO owns a company through a TRS entity that provides 
properties with customary property/hazard insurance as well as additional flood insurance for 
hurricane and tropical storms.  
 
Archstone-Smith (NYSE: ASN) 
Purpose: Archstone-Smith has used subsidiaries to leverage its core expertise in buying, 
developing and operating apartments, as well as to invest in commodity markets and create 
attractive return with shorter-term ownership.  
 
AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (NYSE: AVB)  
Purpose: Used on a limited basis to receive a commission from a "preferred provider" vendor 
used by residents.  
 
Colonial Properties Trust (NYSE: CLP) 
Purpose: Colonial Properties Services, Inc. (CPSI), has been used from 2001 to 2004 to 
accommodate sales from land out-parcels and management fee income, and this year CPSI has 
produced revenue from condo-conversions, build-to-suit contracts, and for-sale projects.  
 
Developers Diversified Realty Corporation (NYSE: DDR) 
Purpose: DDR uses TRS for redevelopments, specifically the CityPlace development in Long 
Beach, Calif., or with its Retail Value Investment Program LP III (RVIP), a joint venture with 
Prudential Real Estate Investors and Coventry Real Estate Partners for development.  
 
Equity Inns (NYSE: ENN) 
Purpose: Equity leases all of its hotels to its taxable REIT subsidiaries.  
 
Gramercy Capital Corp (NYSE: GKK) 
Purpose: TRS were used for the company's $1 billion pricing of commercial real estate 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) in 2005. CDO Securities were issued by two Gramercy 
subsidiaries and consist of $810.5 million of investment grade notes, $84.5 million of non-
investment grade notes and $105 million of preferred shares.  
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Hospitality Properties Trust (NYSE: HPT)  
Purpose: As of June 30, 2005, HPT used TRS to lease and manage 189 of its hotels.  
 
IMPAC Mortgage Holdings (NYSE: IMH) 
Purpose: IMPAC's subsidiaries, IMPAC Funding Corporation, IMPAC Warehouse Lending 
Group, IMPAC Multifamily Capital Corporation, and Novelle Financial Services, have been 
used since 1995 for nonconforming Alt-A mortgage loans, to originate small balance multifamily 
loans through brokers on a wholesale basis, to originate first and second mortgage programs and 
to assist in the development of creative subprime loan products.  
 
Innkeepers USA Trust (NYSE: KPA) 
Purpose: Innkeepers' TRS manage six extended-stay property hotels previously leased to 
Wyndham International.  
 
Kimco Realty Corporation (NYSE: KIM) 
Purpose: Since 2001, Kimco has used the TRS Kimco Realty Services Inc., for real estate 
brokerage, lending to retailers and property owners, debtor in possession financing, 
recapitalization of bankrupt retailers, designation rights agreements, common stock investments, 
non-qualified service activities and merchant building. Kimco Developers Inc, also developed in 
2001, is used to provide partnership capital development expertise on leasing, construction and 
the approval process to developers and landowners to be built or redeveloped retail centers. 
Kimco provides advisory and support services to its properties through Kimsouth Realty Inc, a 
joint venture between Kimco and Prometheus Southeast Retail Trust, acquired in 2002.  
 
Simon Property Group (NYSE: SPG) 
Purpose: M.S. Management Associates, Inc. became a TRS of SPG in 2001. It provides 
management, leasing and other services.  
 
SL Green Realty Corp. (NYSE: SLG) 
Purpose: Established in 2000, eEmerge offers short-term work space solutions for companies 
needing ready-to-use office space.  
 
Thornburg Mortgage (NYSE: TMA) 
Purpose: Thornburg Mortgage formed Thornburg Mortgage Home Loans in May 2004. The TRS 
is used for loan origi- nation, loan acquisition and loan securitizations. The subsidiary also 
presents the ability to diversify funding sources and permanently finance ARM loans through 
CDO issuance.  
 
Winston Hotels Inc. (NYSE: WXH) 
Purpose: Having formed Barclay Hospitality Services in 2002, Winston Hotels Inc. uses the 
subsidiary to lease hotels from the parent company.  
90 
 
 
APPENDIX IX: Macquarie’s ECLIPSE Analysis 
Source: Wenceslao Master’s Thesis (2008) and Whiting (2007) 
 
Stage 1 – First Attempt  
Listed Property companies are lowly geared, illiquid and are usually composed of a single asset. 
REITs are owned mostly by individual investors and do not have a competitive cost of capital.  
 
Stage 2 - Legislative Change  
Government recognizes the benefits of a healthy REIT market and brings in regulatory change to 
encourage REITs. These changes can provoke strong share price gains by property trusts. For 
example, the waiver of dividend taxes in Singapore spurred a new wave of enthusiasm for 
REITs.  
 
Stage 3 - Acquisition Driven Growth  
The market provides REITs with a cost of capital low enough to acquire buildings that are yield- 
accretive. Early REITs gain first mover advantage and have limited competition in the 
acquisition market relative to mature markets. Large earnings per share and dividends per share 
revisions are also possible in Stage 3. This stage ends when yield accretive acquisitions are 
difficult to find and REITs start looking to buy abroad. For example, Australian REITs started 
looking in the United States in the mid 1990’s.  
 
Stage 4 – Growth Plateaus  
As acquisition in local and foreign markets dry up. REITs will then focus on management 
efficiencies of their existing properties in areas such as leasing and property management, 
internal organization restructuring and more aggressive development will also be apparent. Using 
Australian REIT Gander as an example, by late 2005, it had a development pipeline of $1.1 
billion from which it expected to earn an average yield of 8%. Its buildings were 99.9% 
occupied.  
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Stage 5 (Path 1 or Path 2) 
Path 1 - Operational Earnings enter the Income statement  
As acquisitions run out and management efficiencies are maximized, legislation makes changes 
to allow operating businesses, such as property development companies, to be “stapled” to the 
REIT. Similar to the Australian structure, a REIT shareholder would not only own units in the 
trust, but shares in the company as well. This structure allowed Australian REITs to be exposed 
to construction activity at a time when there was a glut in real estate supply and there was 
opportunity to develop. However, Macquarie believes that Asian REIT regulators might not go 
this road as they believe that development might add too much risk and speculation in a REIT’s 
activities.  
 
Path 2 – Inertia  
As Asian REIT Regulators prohibit development activities, they remain pure investments in 
rental income. REIT earnings become more susceptible to interest rates and rental yields in the 
physical property markets. They still provide consistent and stable sources of income but remain 
largely inert investment products.  
 
Stage 6 – Consolidation  
Legislation allows REIT managers start to pursue merger and acquisition strategies. In an effort 
to stop the lost income due to external management fees, REIT managers merge with the REIT. 
This move aligns the interest of the REIT managers and the shareholders. Underperforming 
REITs are also the target of takeovers of more effective REIT managers.  
 
Sector 7 – Growth Plateaus Again  
Lower growth and price gain in the REIT markets. Internal Management structures dominate the 
REIT landscape. 
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Macquarie ECLIPSE Model 
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APPENDIX X: About CapitaLand 
Source: CRCT Prospectus 
 
The Sponsor, CapitaLand Limited, is one of the largest listed property companies in Asia. 
Headquartered in Singapore, the multinational company’s core businesses in property, hospitality 
and real estate financial services are focused in gateway cities in Asia Pacific, Europe and the 
Middle East. The Sponsor’s property and hospitality portfolio spans more than 70 cities in nearly 
18 countries, with total assets exceeding S$18.7 billion as at 30 June 2006. The Sponsor also 
leverages on its significant real estate asset base and market knowledge to develop real estate 
financial products and services in Singapore and the region. 
 
The Sponsor’s listed subsidiaries and associates include the following REITs — CMT 
(Singapore’s first 
REIT), CCT (Singapore’s first commercial REIT), and ART (Singapore’s first pan-Asian 
serviced residence REIT). 
 
For the period ended 30 June 2006, the CapitaLand Group reported profit after tax and minority 
interests of S$288.7 million, a 35.2% increase compared to S$213.6 million in the period ended 
30 June 2005. 
 
The Sponsor, through its indirect wholly-owned subsidiary, CapitaLand China, is well 
established as a reputable real estate developer in China through its 12 years of operations in 
China and its proven track record. The Sponsor’s property portfolio in China spans more than 30 
cities with a total project expenditure of over RMB30 billion. As at mid-2006, CapitaLand China 
has sold over 6,000 residential units, with more than 35,000 units in the pipeline. The residential 
developments include Oasis Riviera and Parc Tresor in Shanghai, La Foret in Beijing, 
Jinshazhou project in Guangzhou, Jiangbei project in Ningbo and Gongshu project in Hangzhou. 
CapitaLand China has completed approximately 270,000 sq m of commercial and integrated 
projects, including the flagship Raffles City Shanghai. There is currently approximately 390,000 
sq m of commercial space in the pipeline including Raffles City Beijing and Capital Tower 
Beijing. 
 
The Sponsor also has a joint venture with Pantaloon Retail (India) Ltd to manage close to 50 
malls across 30 cities and 14 states across India. 
 
CapitaLand Limited has extensive experience in creating, managing and investing in property 
funds and real estate financial products. It identifies attractive assets for injection into new 
property funds to meet the risk-return profiles of local and international investors. It has 
leveraged on opportunities within the asset base of the CapitaLand Group in the origination of, 
and investment in, several property funds, including: 
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• CapitaMall Trust 
In 2002, CMT became the first REIT to be listed on the SGX-ST. It is managed by CMTML, 
which is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the Sponsor. CMT owns ten quality shopping 
centers in Singapore and its investment strategy is to invest in real estate in Singapore which is 
income-producing and which is used, or substantially used, for retail purposes. The investment 
portfolio of CMT is S$4.3 billion and its market capitalization as at 31 August 2006 was 
approximately S$3.3 billion. 
 
• CapitaCommercial Trust 
CCT is Singapore’s first commercial REIT listed in May 2004. Its investment objective is to own 
and invest in real estate and real estate-related assets in Singapore and abroad which are income-
producing and used, or predominantly used, for commercial purposes. CCT currently owns a 
S$3.6 billion portfolio of nine prime properties in the Singapore CBD and Downtown Core.  
CCT is managed by CapitaCommercial Trust Management Limited (“CCTML”), an indirect 
wholly-owned subsidiary of CapitaLand Group. The market capitalization of CCT as at 31 
August 2006 was approximately S$1.8 billion. 
 
• Ascott Residence Trust 
ART, listed in March 2006, is the first Pan-Asian serviced residence REIT established with the 
objective of investing on a long term basis primarily in serviced residences real estate and related 
assets, which are income-producing. Its current asset portfolio comprises 14 serviced residences 
and rental housing property located in Singapore, China, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines and 
Indonesia. These properties are predominantly used as serviced residences or rental housing 
properties in the Pan-Asian region. ART is managed by Ascott Residence Trust Management 
Limited which is a direct wholly-owned subsidiary of The Ascott Group Limited, a leading 
international serviced residence company. The market capitalization of ART as at 31 August 
2006 was S$517.7 million. 
 
• CapitaRetail Japan Fund Private Limited 
CapitaRetail Japan Fund Private Limited was established in 2004 by CapitaLand Financial 
Limited, a member of the CapitaLand Group, as a closed-end private fund to provide institutional 
investors with an opportunity to invest in retail investment properties in Japan. To date, 
CapitaRetail Japan Fund Private Limited has acquired five properties in Japan with a portfolio 
value of approximately Yen 43.3 billion (La Park Mizue in Tokyo, Izumiya Hirakata in Osaka, 
Vivit Square in Tokyo and Ito Yokado Chitose and Ito Yokado Eniwa in Hokkaido). 
 
• CapitaRetail Singapore Limited 
CapitaRetail Singapore Limited was established in 2004 by CapitaLand Retail Limited as a 
special purpose vehicle to issue EUR81.0 million and S$329.0 million in principal amounts of 
bonds secured on three retail malls in Singapore (Bukit Panjang Plaza, Lot One Shoppers’ Mall 
95 
 
and Rivervale Mall) held by CapitaRetail Singapore Limited through separate single purpose 
trusts. 
 
• CapitaLand China Development Fund Pte. Ltd. 
The US$400.0 million fund was closed in October 2005. The fund is sponsored by the Sponsor 
and co-marketed by Citigroup to invest in development projects in China. The fund will focus on 
residential, office, mixed and serviced apartment developments in the high density growth 
centers namely in the Bohai Gulf Region, Yangtze River Delta, Western/Central China and Pearl 
River Delta. 
 
• CapitaLand China Residential Fund Ltd. 
The US$61.0 million fund was launched in October 2003 to invest in mid to high-end residential 
development projects in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou to capitalize on the growth of the 
residential property market in China. 
 
• CapitaRetail China Development Fund 
The Development Fund invests primarily in the development of retail malls in various cities of 
China. The Sponsor has, through its strategic alliance with SZITIC (a Chinese state-owned trust 
and investment firm) secured a pipeline of development projects for the Development Fund. The 
pipeline comprises mainly retail mall developments in China undertaken or to be undertaken by 
the SZITIC Group. The Development Fund may also invest in retail mall developments in China 
with third parties. 
 
The Development Fund has the financial strength, retail development and management expertise 
to acquire land in China for development into successful retail malls that can be offered to CRCT 
for acquisition. The Development Fund was formed on 6 June 2006, with a total committed 
capital from its investors of US$600.0 million, which would allow a maximum total asset size of 
approximately US$1.5 billion. 
 
• CapitaRetail China Incubator Fund 
The Incubator Fund invests in retail malls in China with good long-term potential to generate 
quality income after repositioning, asset enhancement initiatives or leasing activities to increase 
occupancy rates. The Incubator Fund will be able to offer these malls to CRCT for acquisition 
when they meet CRCT’s investment criteria and targeted returns after such repositioning, asset 
enhancement initiatives or leasing activities. The Sponsor has, through its strategic alliance with 
Beijing Hualian, secured a pipeline of retail malls in China for acquisition by the Incubator Fund.  
The pipeline consists of retail malls in China that are owned or to be owned by the Beijing 
Hualian Group. The Incubator Fund may also invest in retail malls in China with third parties. 
The Incubator Fund was formed on 6 June 2006 and has a total committed capital of US$425.0 
million from its investors, which allows a maximum total asset size of approximately US$1.1 
billion. 
